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HIS Article surveys real property law for the period October 1,
1993 through September 30, 1994. For the most part, the cases
were not "earth shaking," although one of the cases decided dur-
ing the Survey period did provide a slight tremor. That case is discussed
in the Homestead section of the Survey. The Homestead section shows
that the Fifth Circuit, in the early part of the Survey period, concluded
that in certain instances mortgages secured by equity in the homestead
were permissible even if such loans were not for purchase money, im-
provements, or taxes. However, on September 29, 1994 (the day before
the Survey period ended) Congress passed and the President signed legis-
lation which effectively overturned the Fifth Circuit's decision. Another
advantageous case (for lenders' counsel) decided during the Survey pe-
riod was the U.S. Supreme Court's decision overturning the so-called
Durrett Rule. At the very least, real estate lawyers have one less matter
to deal with on their comnmfitments for title insurance, subject to Texas'
"anti-deficiency" statutes. Also during the Survey period, Texas replaced
the Condominium Act with the Uniform Condominium Act. A summary
and comparison appears in the section titled "Condominiums." This Sur-
vey does not include every real property case decided during the Survey
period; rather, it includes only ones the authors thought were important
and should be included.
I. LENDING
A. MORTGAGES
The lead-off case dealing with mortgages is Richards v. Suckle,' which
involves the equitable doctrine of subrogation. Two brothers, Barry and
Stephen Suckle, were the owners as tenants in common of an undivided
interest in a wrap around promissory note, secured by a vendor's lien and
a deed of trust lien. In 1981, Barry and Stephen foreclosed, and they
became the owners, as tenants in common, of the real property securing
payment of the wrap around promissory note. Since the Suckle brothers'
interest in the property was subject to an underlying note, which was se-
cured by a deed of trust and vendor's lien, Stephen and Barry had contin-
uing payment obligations to the underlying noteholder. In 1985 Stephen
failed to pay his portion of the principal and interest due and owing, so
Barry made the payment. Barry also paid off the underlying note in 1986
to protect his interest in the land, his brother again refusing to pay his
share of the debt. The liens were released by the noteholder. Barry sued
Stephen based on a theory akin to "am I my brother's keeper?"'2 In 1988
Stephen pledged his interest in the property to his attorney, and in 1989
his attorney foreclosed on that interest, recording a trustee's deed. In
1. 871 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
2. Genesis, 4:9 (Story of Cain and Abel).
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1990 Barry amended his pleadings and sought only subrogation and judi-
cial foreclosure. The trial court decided in Barry's favor and granted his
equitable subrogation to the deed of trust lien against Stephen's interest
in the land. A sheriff's sale was held in 1992, and Barry was the highest
bidder. Stephen's attorney appealed.
It is anticlimactic that the court of appeals affirmed the trial court.
Nonetheless, the case provides some good resource material for compar-
ing the concept of an equitable lien with that of the equitable right of
subrogation. The court noted that "the equitable doctrine of subrogation
holds that where a person, other than the principal obligor, pays a mort-
gage indebtedness on land in which he has an interest, equity will substi-
tute him in place of the original mortgagee, and vest that mortgagee's
rights in him."'3 The court, having noted that the appellant confused the
concept of an equitable lien with that of the equitable right of subroga-
tion,4 then noted that "[a]n equitable lien, however, is one in which a
court of equity implies [a]n agreement arising out of the relationship of
the parties and the circumstances of their dealings."5 The court further
noted that "[t]he foundation of every equitable lien is a contract, either
express or implied, which deals with or operates on some specific prop-
erty; but the contract must be made by some authorized person, or arise
by implication from his acts, before a lien in equity can be created against
the property of the person to be affected by it."'6 The court noted that
there was no agreement between Barry and Stephen for a "lien" against
the property and that, further, Barry did not need a lien since he stood in
the shoes of the original mortgagee. Thus, when Barry paid Stephen's
debt, Barry acquired the right of subrogation which Barry asserted by the
judicial foreclosure. The appellate court held that the lien to which Barry
was subrogated came into existence before the appellant's deed of trust
was created.7 Therefore, the foreclosure of the appellant's inferior lien
could not cut off Barry's superior rights. Note should be taken of the fact
that the court did consider a possible defense to Barry's right of subroga-
tion. The court notes that the appellant could have raised the defense
that she was a good faith purchaser for value; the court further noted that
a good faith purchaser for value wins over the holder of prior equitable
title.8 While the appellant could have raised the defense that she was a
good faith purchaser for value, the court did not consider her a good faith
purchaser for value. The "Genesis" for the underlying facts of this case
(i.e., brother against brother) has some basis in history.
3. id. at 241 (citing First Nat'l Bank Houston v. Ackerman, 70 Tex. 315, 8 S.W. 45, 47
(1888)); Johnson v. Koenig, 353 S.W.2d 478, 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
4. 871 S.W.2d at 241.
5. Id.
6. Id at 241-42.
7. Id. at 241-43.
8. Id at 242.
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The next case may emphasize the need for refresher courses in modern
mathematics. In McLemore v. Pacific Southwest Bank, FSB,9 a suit for a
deficiency resulting from a real estate foreclosure, the issues are un-
remarkable except for the fact that the summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff (Bank) was revised twice by the trial court and once by the ap-
pellate court to correct mathematical errors on the part of the Bank in
the calculation of interest. Thus, this case indicates that the trial court has
discretion to convert the computation of amount due.10 A peripheral is-
sue involved the fact that, although the Bank sent the borrower notice of
its intention to accelerate, it never notified the borrower prior to foreclo-
sure that it had actually accelerated the note. The court of appeals held
that one may "reasonably infer that a notice of intent to accelerate fol-
lowed by a notice of a trustee's sale constitutes a notice of accelera-
tion."" Interestingly, this is an issue that the Supreme Court specifically
declined to consider in an earlier case.' 2
The Dallas Court of Appeals in Giese v. NCNB Texas Forney Banking
Center13 was faced with the question of "is it real?" and its answer was to
the effect of "get real." The court was asked to decide the proper method
for perfecting a lien on a mobile home that was affixed to real estate. In
1984, the appellant sold a parcel of land to Mr. and Mrs. Farmer. The
land was improved with a 1981 Schult double-wide mobile home with
plumbing, electricity, a septic system, a porch and a deck. In connection
with the sale, the Farmers executed a note payable to appellant which was
secured by a deed of trust on the property and a financing statement on
the mobile home. The deed of trust and financing statement were filed in
the county clerk's office. In 1986, the appellee Bank's predecessor in in-
terest made a loan to the Farmers which was secured by the mobile home.
The Bank's lien was noted on the certificate of title of the mobile home.
When the Farmers defaulted on the Bank's note, the Bank repossessed
the mobile home and sold it. The appellant sued the Bank, seeking a
declaration that she possessed a superior lien (because her filing in the
count records was a prior perfected lien) and also seeking damages for
the destruction of the porch, deck and other improvements caused by the
Bank's removal of the mobile home from the land. The appellate court
reviewed the Texas Manufactured Housing Standards Act,' 4 which gov-
erns perfection of security interests in mobile homes, and concluded that
there are two methods for perfecting a lien on a mobile home which is
permanently attached to the ground: "(1) a party can perfect her lien in
the real property records if she surrenders and cancels her title docu-
ments; or (2) if the party does not surrender and cancel her title, the party
9. 872 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ dism'd by agr.).
10. Id. at 290-91.
11. 1d at 292.
12. Ogden v. Gibralter Savings Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. 1982).
13. 881 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
14. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302(c)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
1532 [Vol. 48
REAL PROPERTY
must note the lien on the certificate of title."'15 Since the title was not
cancelled and the Bank's lien was the only lien noted on the certificate of
title, it was not "real," and the court held that the Bank's lien was supe-
rior. Unfortunately for the Bank, the court remanded the case on the
issue of whether the Bank's manner of removing the mobile home unrea-
sonably caused damages to the various improvements; in fact, in her orig-
inal petition, appellant alleged that she had real damages of $60,000.
B. FORECLOSURE
GOODBYE DURRETT! In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.'6 Justice
Scalia has answered the perennial question facing a creditor who is con-
ducting a mortgage foreclosure of real estate: "How much should I bid?"
The Supreme Court overturned the so-called rule of Durrett v. Washing-
ton National Insurance Co.17 and held that "a reasonably equivalent
value"'18 means, for foreclosed real property, the price in fact received at
the foreclosure sale, so long as all of the requirements of the state's fore-
closure law have been met.' 9 The crux of the opinion is that the term
"fair market value" does not appear in section 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code; rather, section 548 deals with the concept of "reasonably
equivalent value." As the opinion notes, other sections of the Bank-
ruptcy Code take into account "fair market value," but not section 548.20
The court limited its opinion to foreclosures of mortgages on real estate
only.
It is important to note that the court considered that the guarantors
had a statutory right to notice of the foreclosure sale. Although not ex-
pressly stated in the case, the guarantors must have waived any rights to
notice in the guaranty agreement.
During the Survey period the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals gave
some insight into how to cover all the foreclosure bases. Rosedale Part-
ners v. Resolution Trust Corp.21 actually dealt, among other things, with
the election of remedies by a mortgagee. In 1987, a lender obtained a
declaratory judgment against the makers of a promissory note whereby
the court ordered a judicial foreclosure of the property securing payment
of the note and, in addition, declared that the lender had the right to post
and sell the property at a non-judicial foreclosure. In 1992, the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation (RTC), as the successor in interest to the lender,
posted the property for a non-judicial foreclosure to be held on Decem-
15. 881 S.W.2d at 781 (emphasis in original).
16. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
17. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit held that a foreclosure sale that
yielded 57% of the property's fair market value could be set aside and indicated in its
opinion that any sale for less than 70% of fair market value should be set aside-the so-
called "Durrett Rule." Not all federal circuits followed the "Durrett Rule."
18. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
19. 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
20. Id. at 1761.
21. 882 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
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ber 1, 1992. The RTC was the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. In
January 1993, the RTC sold its rights under the 1987 judgment to
Rosedale, specifically retaining all collateral upon which the RTC had
foreclosed. The RTC subsequently entered into a sales contract with a
third party, agreeing to convey the real estate with a closing to occur on
February 16, 1993. Prior to the closing, Rosedale obtained a writ of exe-
cution on the 1987 judgment, and a sheriff's sale on the property was
noticed for April 16, 1993. The RTC filed suit against Rosedale, seeking
an injunction and damages and obtained a summary judgment in its
favor. Rosedale appealed, claiming that the 1992 non-judicial foreclosure
was void because there had been an election of remedies in the 1987 liti-
gation and the lender had elected a judicial sale. Consequently, accord-
ing to Rosedale, the power of sale under the deed of trust was abandoned
or extinguished. The appellate court interpreted the 1987 judgment to
give lender an "either - or" method of foreclosure; i.e., either conduct a
sheriff's sale or foreclose non-judicially under the deed of trust.22 Is
there any good case law here? Probably not, but there is a moral - "you
can have your cake and eat it too."
C. GUARANTY
TO ALL GUARANTORS (ESPECIALLY IN AND AROUND
CORPUS CHRISTI): YOU ARE HEREBY GIVEN NOTICE THAT
YOU WILL NOT BE GIVEN NOTICE. In Long v. NCNB-Texas Na-
tional Bank,23 the Bank sued the guarantors of a promissory note for the
deficiency resulting from a real property foreclosure. The guarantors
were not notified of the foreclosure sale before it took place. The court
held "that the guarantors of a note secured by realty do not enjoy the
right to notice of the foreclosure sale." 24 Furthermore, the court noted
that (1) unlike the foreclosure of personal property, the term "debtor" as
used in the Texas Property Code 25 does not include guarantors; 26 and (2)
a guarantor does not have standing to contest the legal sufficiency of a
non-judicial foreclosure unless the guarantor has a property interest in
the foreclosed real estate.27
One case decided during the Survey period asked whether a guarantor
is discharged from his or her obligation when there is a material altera-
tion in the underlying contract. In Sonne v. FDI?8 several guarantors
agreed to be liable for fixed portions of a debt. The face amount of the
debt was later increased, although the amount of the personal guaranties
remained unchanged. 29 The guarantors argued that the increased indebt-
22. Id. at 628.
23. 882 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
24. Id at 866.
25. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b)(3) (Vernon 1984).
26. 882 S.W.2d at 863.
27. Id. at 865-67.
28. 881 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
29. Id. at 790-91.
1534 [Vol. 48
REAL PROPERTY
edness on the underlying contract constituted a material alteration, which
indicated that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties.
Without a meeting of the minds, no contract was formed, which barred
the guarantors' personal liability on the guaranties. 30 The court agreed
that the increased debt was a material alteration, but found that the guar-
antors had waived the alteration, which maintained their liability on the
note.31 The court also noted that since the increased debt had not af-
fected the amount for which each guarantor was liable on his fixed guar-
anty, the guarantors had failed to demonstrate harm from the alteration,
as was their burden on the affirmative defense of material alteration.32
Ocean Transport, Inc. v. Greycas, Inc.33 dealt with the statute of limita-
tions in suits against guarantors. In Ocean Transport guarantors were
personally liable for all claims against Ocean Transport, Inc. When the
corporation defaulted on a promissory note to Greycas, Greycas brought
suit to enforce the guaranties. One defense raised by the guarantors was
that the suit was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.34 They
argued that a cause of action on the debt accrued on March 14, 1986
(when Greycas accelerated the debt), so the limitations period expired on
March 14, 1990. Greycas filed a deficiency suit as a counterclaim against
Ocean Transport on April 1, 1991, after taking a nonsuit in a previously
filed action against Ocean Transport.35 Greycas maintained that claims
which arise under the Ship Mortgage Act 36 are not subject to a limitations
period. 37
The court first explored whether the limitations period had actually ex-
pired against the borrower, Ocean Transport. A cause of action generally
accrues "when facts come into existence which authorize a claimant to
seek a judicial remedy. ' '38 Here the promissory note authorized Greycas
to declare the note payable, at its option, upon default of full payment of
any installment.39 Testimony indicated that a memorandum which accel-
erated the note was sent to one of the guarantors on March 14, 1986, so
30. Id. at 791.
31. Id. at 792. The increased debt had been initialled, although the record was silent
as to whose initials appeared next to the alteration. Id. at 791. The court relied primarily
on language in the guaranties which stated that "[t]he undersigned (Guarantors) jointly
and severally agrees to pay to the Lender at its address set above, when due or declared, all
debt or other liability of every kind for which Debtor now is or hereafter shall be obligated to
Lender .. " Id. at 792 (emphasis in original). The court determined that the italicized
language "accounted for any potential increases in the overall indebtedness under the note
and intended to maintain the validity of the individual guaranties despite such increases."
Id Therefore, the guarantors had waived the right to complain of a material alteration in
the promissory note.
32. Id. at 793-94.
33. 878 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).
34. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(3) (Vernon 1986); 878 S.W.2d at
266.
35. 878 S.W.2d at 261.
36. See 46 U.S.C. § 954(a) (1988).
37. 878 S.W.2d at 266.





that was the date upon which the promissory note was declared acceler-
ated and the cause of action accrued. Even with the tolling of the limita-
tions period to account for Greycas' non-suit, the limitations period
expired before Greycas filed its later counterclaim in 1991.40 Therefore,
the limitations period had expired as to the claims against Ocean
Transport.
The next question for the court was whether the limitations period as
to Ocean Transport was applicable to the deficiency suit against the guar-
antors. The court first noted that since the Ship Mortgage Act did not
establish a statute of limitations, the suit on the deficiency would be gov-
erned by the relevant state statute of limitations.41 The court then stated
that where a lender can sue the guarantor without suing the note's maker,
the expiration of the limitations period as to the maker (here, Ocean
Transport) is not a defense available to the guarantor.42 The only in-
stance in which limitations is an available defense is where the limitations
period applies to the guaranty as well as to the principal obligation.4 3
Since the guaranty language provided that Greycas did not have to sue
Ocean Transport before it could sue the guarantors,"n the guarantors
could not defend on grounds of the limitations period expiring against
Ocean Transport.
The court last turned to the question of whether the limitations period
had expired against the guarantors. The guaranty agreements stated that
Greycas was required to give written notice to the guarantors before the
note accelerated. Written notice was given to the maker in November
1985. As to the obligors, however, there was no evidence as to when they
received notice. Since limitations was their affirmative defense, and the
guarantors had the burden of proof regarding accrual of the cause of ac-
tion, the failure to present evidence as to the notice date barred their
limitations defense.45 Therefore, Greycas could not sue the maker under
the note, but was able to maintain a suit against the guarantors.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 266.
42. Id at 267. This holding was challenged in another case during the Survey period.
See Wiman v. Tomaszewicz, 877 S.W.2d 1, 5-7 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ). In
Wiman a guarantor argued that it was unfair to subject a guarantor to liability when the
maker's liability was barred by limitations, since the guarantor could not then pursue re-
course against the maker. 877 S.W.2d at 6. The court responded that often limitations runs
concurrently as to both the maker and the guarantor. Id. at 7. Otherwise, the Texas rule is
that the guarantor may be sued independently and may not assert the maker's limitations
defense. Id.
43. Id.
44. The Guaranty provided in part that the guarantors' liability was "primary, direct
and immediate. Guarantor[s] ... agree that neither (i) the exercise or the failure to exer-
cise by Greycas ... of any rights or remedies conferred on it .... (ii) the recovery of a
judgment against Borrower or Obligor. (iii) [T]he commencement of an action at law or
the recovery of a judgment at law against Borrower or Obligor and the enforcement






D & S King's Way Ventures v. Texas Capital Bank-Richmond, N.A. 46
is noteworthy for its "what if" value. In this case, Texas Capital Bank
filed suit against the appellants to recover on a defaulted note. The ap-
pellant answered and counterclaimed for usury. The trial court held that
the bank failed to prove the amount of its deficiency and that appellants
failed to prove their usury counterclaim. The note upon which the bank
sued was secured by a deed of trust and security agreement giving the
bank a first lien on certain residential property. The bank held a public
sale, foreclosed on the real property, and purchased it for $225,000. The
bank filed its original and first amended petitions which did not specifi-
cally reference the foreclosure sale or the purchase of the property by the
bank. The first amended pleading continued to pray for judgment on the
full amount of the note, i.e. $507,500. However, the second amended pe-
tition prayed for judgment in the amount of $507,500, less any credits
being properly allowed by the court as a result of the foreclosure sale.
The appellant's usury claim was based solely on the pleadings. The ap-
pellants contended that the bank's first amended petition constituted a
"charge" of usurious interest because it did not reflect a credit for the
amount received at the foreclosure. The appellants also contended that
the bank "received" usurious interest because it "received" $225,000, but
failed to credit it to the balance owed on the note.
Of course, the issue regarding the "charge" of usurious interest in a
pleading is no longer open for consideration.47 A more interesting issue
related to the appellant's claim that the bank's last pleading, stating that
the bank was owed $507,500, is an admission that the bank "received" or
was attempting to receive usurious interest. The appellants asserted that
the testimony showed that the $225,000 was not applied to reduce the
$507,500 principal. The court, in holding against the appellants on the
usury claim, referred to the fact that the appellants did not provide the
court with citations to the record in which such evidence could be
found.48 The reliance on testimony showing that the $225,000 was not
applied to reduce the $507,500 principal is questionable. Could a con-
trary finding have changed the result? The appellants made a distinction
between the charging of a usurious amount of interest and the receiving
of usury, and the court followed along.
In Peoples State Bank of Clyde v. Andrews49 the court affirmed the
principle that a claim of usury is restricted to the immediate parties to the
transaction. In this case, the bank sued the makers of the note as well as
46. 882 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
47. In George A. Fuller Co. of Texas, Inc. v. Carpet Serv., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.
1992), the Supreme Court held that a pleading by itself, even if it contains a claim for
usurious interest, does not constitute a charge of usurious interest for purposes of the
Texas usury statute. Claims which appear solely in a pleading do not constitute a charge
for usurious interest.
48. 882 S.W.2d at 575.
49. 881 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994, no writ).
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Andrews, whom the bank alleged was a "guarantor" of the debt. The
trial court awarded the bank a judgment against the makers and, in addi-
tion, held that the bank's demand against Andrews constituted a usurious
charge of interest. Andrews was awarded treble damages plus interest
and court costs. The trial court found that Andrews did not assume the
note in question and was not an obligor on the note.50 In turn, the appel-
late court held that the mere sending of the demand letter cannot make a
person an obligor on a note. The appellate court noted that "[a]s a stran-
ger to the note, Andrews is not entitled to an award of penalties under
Articles 5069-8.01 and 5069-8.02."' 51
II. HOMESTEAD
An inspection of the Texas homestead law during the early part of the
Survey period revealed that the Texas homestead exemption had devel-
oped a crack in its foundation. Upon further inspection, however, it ap-
pears the crack has been repaired. In First Gibraltar Bank FSB v.
Morales,52 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that fed-
eral law preempts Texas homestead law insofar as the Texas homestead
law prohibits federal savings associations and "state housing creditors" 53
from engaging in reverse annuity mortgages (RAMs) and line of credit
conversion mortgages, thereby taking enforceable security interests in
real estate that qualifies as homestead property under Texas law. In ar-
riving at its conclusion, the court discussed the state of the current home-
stead law and noted that "[s]trong legal protection of the homestead from
foreclosure has long been viewed as an important public policy in
Texas.",54 In the court's discussion of the background of Texas homestead
law, the court referred to Wood v. Wheeler55 in which Chief Justice
Hemphill, discussing the Texas homestead exemption, noted that "[tihe
object of such exemption is to confer on the beneficiary a home as an
asylum, a refuge which cannot be invaded nor its tranquility or serenity
disturbed, and in which may be nurtured and cherished those feelings of
individual independence which lie at the foundation and are essential to
the permanency of our institutions. ' 56 Of course, the source of the Texas
homestead exemption is the Texas Constitution, which provides as
follows:
[H]omestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is
hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts ex-
cept for the purchase money thereof, or a part of such purchase
money, the taxes due thereon, or for work and material used in con-
50. Id. at 522.
51. Id.; see also TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. §§ 5069-8.01 -8.02 (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
1995).
52. 19 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 1994).
53. See 12 U.S.C. § 3803(a)(3) (1988).
54. 19 F.3d at 1036.
55. 7 Tex. 13 (1851)
56. Id at 22 (emphasis added).
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structing improvements thereon.... No mortgage, trust deed, or
other lien on the homestead shall ever be valid, except for the
purchase money therefor, or improvements made thereon, as herein-
before provided.5 7
Although First Gibraltar Bank FSB v. Morales is now moot, the case is
discussed in the next several paragraphs to provide the background for
how the "foundation" was repaired.
First Gibraltar FSB is a federally chartered savings bank, and Benefi-
cial Texas Inc. is a non-federally chartered financial services corporation
licensed to do business in Texas. First Gibraltar and Beneficial (the
"Banks") filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
in federal district court against Dan Morales as Attorney General for the
State of Texas and Albert Endsley as Texas Consumer Credit Commis-
sioner. The Banks requested the district court to (1) declare that federal
law preempts Texas homestead law to the extent that Texas law prohibits
federal savings associations from enforcing liens taken in alternative
mortgage transactions secured by a homeowner's equity, such as in the
case of reverse annuity mortgages and line of credit conversion mort-
gages, and (2) declare that the federal preemption also extends to state
chartered institutions under the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act of 1982.58 The United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Banks.59 Several
amici curiae, including the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Texas
Association of Realtors and Texas Savings, filed briefs in the court of
appeals. It is important to note that the issue, as defined by the court,
was whether federal statutes and regulations have preempted Texas
homestead law to the extent that Texas homestead law prohibits lenders
from enforcing liens on home equity created in RAMs or line of credit
conversion mortgages. The court expressly limited its preemption analy-
sis and its decision to the RAM and line of credit conversion mortgage. 60
The Banks did not seek a declaration that Texas homestead law had been
preempted in its entirety; rather, the Banks admitted that Texas home-
stead law would continue to apply in such contexts as "fixed rate, fixed-
term home loan transactions, federal bankruptcies [in which state exemp-
tions are claimed], and judgment creditor claims against individual debt-
ors."61 For purposes of the court's discussion, it noted that RAM and line
of credit conversion mortgages come within the broad catch-all term "al-
ternative mortgage transaction" (AMT), which describes mortgage in-
struments that do not conform to the traditionally fully amortized, fixed
interest rate mortgage loan. The court does note, however, that AMTs
include such instruments as the adjustable interest rate mortgage and the
57. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 50 (1876); see also, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(Vernon Supp. 1995) (providing for certain statutory homestead rights).
58. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3806 (1988).
59. First Gibraltar Bank FSB v. Morales, 815 F.Supp. 1008 (W.D. Tex. 1993).




graduated payment mortgage. The reason that the Banks focused on the
RAM and the line of credit conversion mortgage is that these two forms
of AMTs are directly foreclosed by the impact of the Texas homestead
law, and that is not the case with respect to the adjustable interest rate
mortgage and the graduated payment mortgage. 62 For purposes of its dis-
cussion, the court cited Black's Law Dictionary, which defined a RAM as
"[a] mortgage format under which the mortgage loan proceeds are dis-
bursed periodically over a long time period to provide regular income for
the borrower-mortgagor. The loan will usually be repaid in a lump sum
when the mortgagor dies or the property is sold."'63
The court discussed the preemption doctrine,64 and the authors of this
article refer to the opinion for the court's discussion of this topic. Note,
however, that the court cites Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission65 and Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. de la Cuesta66 for the proposition that state law can be pre-
empted by regulations promulgated by federal agencies acting within the
scope of their congressionally delegated authority as well as by federal
legislation. Further, agency decisions to preempt state law are entitled to
judicial deference, and if an agency's choice to preempt "represents a rea-
sonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to
the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not
one that Congress would have sanctioned. '67
For purposes of its decision, the court considered the law before 1983
and since 1983, which represents the time at which the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) revised its regulatory scheme. In determin-
ing the preemption question, the court began with the Home Owners
Loan Act (HOLA),68 which provided for the creation of a system of fed-
eral savings and loan associations regulated by the FHLBB. 69 In 1989
Congress dissolved the FHLBB and created the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion (OTS) in its place.70
In 1978, the FHLBB authorized federal savings associations to use
three new types of mortgage instruments, including the RAM, on a na-
tionwide basis. The purpose of the new regulations was to meet the
needs of homeowners during different phases of their financial life-
cycles.71 In 1981 the FHLBB promulgated a number of amendments re-
62. Id.
63. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1011 (6th Ed. 1990); see also 12 C.F.R. § 545.33(a)
(1993).
64. 19 F.3d at 1039, 1040.
65. 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
66. 458 U.S. 141,153 (1982).
67. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988) (citing United States v. Shimer,
367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
68. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468(c) (1988).
69. 19 F.3d at 1041 (citing de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159-60).
70. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1462a-1464 (1988).
71. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,336 (1978).
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garding the lending authority of federal savings associations, including 12
C.F.R. section 545.6-4(a)(ii), which authorizes certain alternative mort-
gage instruments (including RAMs). The amendment provides, in part,
as follows:
this regulation is promulgated pursuant to the plenary and exclusive
authority of the Board to regulate all aspects of Federal associations
.... This exercise of the Board's authority is preemptive of any state
law purporting to address the subject of a Federal association's abil-
ity or right to make, purchase or participate in the alternative mort-
gage instrument set forth in this section, or to directly or indirectly
restrict such ability.72
When the Supreme Court decided the de la Cuesta case in June 1982, it
recognized that Congress may delegate its power to preempt state laws to
federal agencies such as the FHLBB.73 Further, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that Congress had given the FHLBB the authority to regulate the
lending practices of federal savings and loans so as to further HOLA's
purposes.74
As noted, in 1983 the FHLBB discontinued its practice of promulgating
regulations specifically empowering federal savings associations to act
and to permit such associations to exercise all powers granted to them by
HOLA subject only to limitations contained in the regulations. The pro-
vision concerning preemption was relocated to 12 C.F.R. section 542.2.75
As noted by the court of appeals, regulatory limitations on the power
of savings associations to make loans on the security of real estate are
found in 12 C.F.R. section 545.32,76 one such limitation providing, in per-
tinent part, as follows: "a loan is made on the security of real estate if:...
(2) [t]he security interest of the Federal savings association may be en-
forced as a real estate mortgage or its equivalent pursuant to the law of
the state in which the property is located ... ."77 This is the provision on
which the district court relied for purposes of determining that Texas
homestead law had not been preempted.
The court analyzed the application of the preemption doctrine under
the rules set out in de la Cuesta.78 The rule requires consideration of two
questions, i.e. did the agency intend to preempt the state law in question
and, if so, was that action within the scope of the agency's delegated au-
thority? With respect to the agency's intent to preempt state law, the
court of appeals reviewed the agency's intent prior to 1983 and since
1983. The court, citing de la Cuesta, notes that any ambiguity regarding
agency intent arising from the text of the regulations themselves may be
dispelled by reasonable agency constructions of the regulations.79 The
72. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(a)(ii) (1982).
73. 19 F.3d at 1041-42 (citing de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54).
74. 19 F.3d at 1041-42.
75. 12 C.F.R. § 542.2 (1984).
76. 1& § 545.32 (1993).
77. Id. § 545.32(c)(2) (1993).
78. 458 U.S. at 154.
79. Id. at 158 n.13.
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court notes that the regulations existing prior to 1983 clearly meet this
test. State laws that "directly or indirectly" restricted the ability of fed-
eral savings associations to engage in graduated payment or RAMs were
explicitly preempted by 12 C.F.R. section 545.6-48(a)(2).80 The court
noted that Texas homestead laws indirectly prohibit RAM lending on
property classified as homestead property because RAM lending depends
entirely on the enforceability of liens taken in the owner's equity.81 Such
laws were therefore in conflict with the FHLBB regulations existing prior
to 1983.
The court next considered whether the 1983 revision of the real estate
lending regulations manifested a contrary non-preemptive intent. Based
on its analysis, the court concluded that the FHLBB did not manifest an
intent to end its preemption of inconsistent state laws such as Texas
homestead laws in its 1983 revision of its real estate lien regulations. 82
The only stumbling block for the court of appeals was 12 C.F.R. section
545.32(c)(2), 83 upon which the district court relied in determining that the
OTS regulations did not preempt Texas homestead law. 84 The court of
appeals reviewed the history of section 545.32(c)(2) and determined that
it was adopted to deal with the problem of classifying property interest in
time-share units, thus granting an association the opportunity to make a
real estate loan on the security of a unit if the property is real estate
property under state law. The court, relying on de la Cuesta, stated that
we may recognize that 12 C.F.R. § 545.32(c)(2) incorporates state
law generally concerning the creation of an enforceable security in-
terest in real property, and, at the same time, conclude that other
provisions of the OTS's regulations have preempted one aspect of
state law affecting the enforceability of a security interest in real
property-the homestead law-in part.85
The second question under de la Cuesta required the court to deter-
mine whether the OTS's attempted preemption of Texas homestead law
is within the scope of the agency's delegated authority.86 The court con-
cluded that the OTS did not exceed its authority in preempting Texas
homestead law insofar as that law prohibits federal savings associations
from engaging in RAMs and line of credit conversion mortgages and
thereby taking enforceable security interest in real estate that qualifies as
homestead property under Texas law.8 7 In reaching its conclusion, the
court noted that the purpose of HOLA was to provide the country with
sources of housing financing, and the purpose has been carried forward in
12 U.S.C. section 1464(a), which authorizes the OTS to regulate the or-
80. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-48(a)(2) (1982)
81. 19 F.3d at 1045.
82. d at 1045.
83. 12 C.F.R. § 545.32(c)(2) (1993).
84. 19 F.3d at 1046 (citing First Gibraltar Bank, 815 F. Supp. at 1014); see also 12
C.F.R. § 545.32(c)(2) (1993).
85. 19 F.3d at 1046 (citing de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 1057).
86. Id. at 1049 (citing de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 1054).
87. Id. at 1052.
1542 [Vol. 48
REAL PROPERTY
ganization and operation of federal savings associations "[iun order to
provide thrift institutions for the deposit of funds and for the extension of
credit for homes and other goods and services."8 The court noted that
[t]he decision of the FHLBB/OTS to preempt Texas homestead law
in the case of RAMs and line of credit conversion mortgages,
thereby greatly expanded the pool of collateral available to Texans
for borrowing purposes, is entirely consistent with the HOLA's pur-
pose of ensuring the broadest availability of credit for general con-
sumer purposes.89
The final issue considered by the court is whether the federal statutes
and regulations at issue preempt Texas homestead law so as to allow non-
federally chartered associations to engage in RAM and line of credit con-
version mortgage lending. The court noted the Parity Act was enacted
with the express purpose of putting non-federally chartered housing lend-
ers on a level playing field with federal savings associations. 90 The court
had little difficulty in concluding that Congress empowered the OTS to
authorize state housing creditors to engage in RAM and line of credit
conversion mortgage lending through the Parity Act.
The court's opinion was handed down April 29, 1994, and, of course,
made for nice reading and discussion for exactly five months until Sep-
tember 29, 1994 when the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994 was enacted in the second session of the 103d
Congress. 91
Several other opinions decided during the Survey period deserve men-
tion. In Bransom v. Standard Hardware, Inc.92 (citing First State Bank v.
Zelesky93 and Smith v. Green94), the court held that property purchased
or improved with stolen funds can never acquire homestead rights as they
are held in trust for the rightful owners of the funds.95 In Bransom, the
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1988).
89. First Gibraltar Bank, 19 F.3d at 1051.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 3801(b) (1988).
91. Pub. L. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338. On September 29, 1994 (one day before the end of
the Survey period) Congress amended HOLA by inserting the following new subsection:
(f) STATE HOMESTEAD PROVISIONS.-No provision of this Act or
any other provision of law administered by the Director shall be construed as
superseding any homestead provision of any State constitution, including any
implementing State statute, in effect on the date of enactment of the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, or any subse-
quent amendment to such a State constitutional or statutory provision in ef-
fect on such date, that exempts the homestead of any person from
foreclosure or forced sale, or the payment of all debts, other than a purchase
money obligation relating to the homestead, taxes due on the homestead, or
an obligation arising from work and material used in constructing improve-
ments on the homestead.
So there you have it-the foundation of the Texas homestead exemption has been repaired
and even strengthened until such time as the voters of the state of Texas amend the Texas
Constitution.
92. 874 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied)
93. 262 S.W. 190,192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Gaveston 1924, no writ).
94. 243 S.W. 1006, 1008 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, writ ref'd).
95. Bransom, 874 S.W.2d at 928.
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appellant, Donald Bransom, was married to Angela Bransom who was an
officer and director of Standard Hardware. During her employment from
1986 to September 15, 1991, she served as comptroller and bookkeeper
and she was in charge of Standard's financial affairs. Beginning May 18,
1988, she began embezzling funds from two bank accounts owned by
Standard. The court found that Angela fraudulently converted approxi-
mately $480,000. The court of appeals concluded that the evidence was
legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellant (Don-
ald) knew the family's expenditures far exceeded that reasonably afforda-
ble on his and his wife's legitimate income, participated in the fraud, had
constructive knowledge of the fraud, and knowingly and willingly re-
ceived the benefits of the fraud.96 However, the court of appeals did af-
firm the trial court's judgment that appellant was unjustly enriched in the
amount of approximately $480,000. The court of appeals affirmed the
imposition of a constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale of appel-
lant's homestead. 97 The court indicated that constructive trusts, being re-
medial in nature, have the very broad function of redressing wrongs or
unjust enrichment in accordance with basic principles of equity and jus-
tice. 98 The court, citing Pace v. McEwen99 among other cases, indicated
that the homestead protection afforded by the Texas Constitution was
never intended to protect stolen funds.
The court noted, however, that its holding is contrary to that of the
Dallas Court of Appeals which held that the Texas Constitution home-
stead protection barred the foreclosure of a judicial equity lien to recover
embezzled funds.100 In the Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. case, the
court declared the lien void because the mandatory protection provided
by the Constitution divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
The view of the court in Bransom is that this is both contrary to the inten-
tions of the Constitution's framers and a distortion of the homestead pro-
tection. 1°1 Thus, Bransom is another case in which the homestead
exemption is not so sacrosanct.
Finally, how can one have a survey of Texas homestead cases without
including at least one "pretend sale" case? This year's case, however,
definitely has a twist. In Ketcham v. First Nat'l Bank of New Boston,
Texas'02 the appellant's son stated in an affidavit that he (the son) re-
quested a loan from the Bank; that the Bank officer told him that he
needed more collateral; that the Bank officer asked him (appellant's son)
if his parents would sell him their homestead which he could use as collat-
eral; and that the Bank said that they (appellant and her husband) would
96. Id. at 927.
97. Id. at 928.
98. Id. (citing Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex. 1974)).
99. 617 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
100. Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. v. Glover, 701 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. 874 S.W.2d at 928.
102. 875 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, no writ).
1544 [Vol. 48
REAL PROPERTY
not really sell the home. The son, not the appellant, considered the con-
veyance to be a sham. Of course, the typical pretend sale case involves a
situation where the owner of the homestead "sells" the homestead to ob-
tain a loan. In such cases, the key issue to be resolved in determining
whether a sale is real or pretended is the factual question of whether the
parties intended title to vest in the purchaser. 0 3 In Ketcham, Lorene
Ketcham brought suit against the Bank alleging that it had committed
fraud by breaching its fiduciary duty to disburse funds of $60,000 that
came available upon the sale of her house to her son. The Bank, through
affidavit and testimony, showed that (1) it advanced the funds to a trust
account belonging to the attorney who assisted with the sale; (2) the at-
torney gave a check for the balance to Lorene Ketcham and her husband;
that the check was endorsed back to the attorney; and (3) at Ketcham's
direction, the attorney wrote a check making the balance of the proceeds
payable to her son and daughter-in-law. The court of appeals believed
that the evidence was sufficient to raise a factual issue as to whether the
transfer was part of a "pretended sale" instigated by the Bank for the
purpose of circumventing Constitutional homestead protections. 10 4 The
fact that the money was not applied to Lorene's loans did not matter to
the court. The court noted that the Constitution does not impose such
restriction and the court would not infer one. 05
III. DEEDS/CONVEYANCES
There are several cases reported during the Survey period with inter-
esting fact situations; nonetheless, the facts may change but the law stays
the same. In Club Corporation of America v. Concerned Property Own-
ers for April Sound' 6 the trial court considered cross motions for sum-
mary judgment on one issue, i.e. whether or not there were any unsold
lots in April Sound. The appellee, Concerned Property Owners for April
Sound, was an unincorporated association of a twelve-member group of
persons who were residential lot owners at April Sound subdivision near
Conroe, Texas. The appellee alleged that it was entitled to elect five
trustees to operate the April Sound Property Owners Association, Inc.
(the "POA" and not to be confused with the Concerned Property Owners
for April Sound, an unincorporated association). The appellee's basis for
maintaining its right to elect five trustees to operate the property owners
association stems from its contention that all necessary prerequisites to
the development of April Sound subdivision had been met, including the
fact that there were no longer any unsold building sites in the April
103. See, e.g., Hardie & Co. v. Campbell, 63 Tex. 292 (1885); McGahey v. Ford, 563
S.W.2d 857, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Nowlin v. William
Cameron & Co., 54 S.W.2d 1035 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1932, writ ref'd); Eckard v.
Citizens Nat'l. Bank of Abilene, 588 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
104. Ketcham, 875 S.W.2d at 756.
105. Id.
106. 881 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).
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Sound subdivision. The POA was established in 1972 as a nonprofit cor-
poration. The bylaws for the POA provided that no member of the POA
was entitled to vote as long as building sites in April Sound remained
unsold. The bylaws defined the term "unsold" as follows: "The term 'un-
sold' when used with reference to a building site in April Sound shall
mean that the title to such building site has not been conveyed out of
Developer and that Developer is actively engaged in activities designed
to promote the sale of the building site to any person or entity not affili-
ated with the Developer. ' 10 7 It is interesting to note that an affidavit
which was part of the summary judgment evidence contained a statement
that the developer currently held title to at least 290 building sites in
April Sound, so how is it that the appellee could argue that there were no
unsold buildings sites?
The answer was contained in the "Agreement" between the developer/
seller and the purchaser of a lot or building site. The Agreement in this
case provided "[f]or the consideration and under the terms and consider-
ations set forth, Seller agrees to sell and convey to Purchaser, and Pur-
chaser agrees to purchase... the surface and surface rights to a lot to be
designated by Seller ... .,,108 The Agreement provided that once the pur-
chaser had fulfilled its obligations under the Agreement, the seller would
designate a lot and the purchaser could commence construction of its res-
idence. The court did note that under the terms of the "Agreement" the
purchaser could not specifically enforce the Agreement to require the
seller to sell any specific lots.' 9 The "Agreement" also provided as fol-
lows: "[iut is expressly understood that this agreement shall not be con-
strued as a conveyance or sale of the property above described but shall
be construed as a mere agreement to sell the property . . . ."1 The ap-
pellee's contention to the trial court was that the "agreement" was a con-
tract of sale (sometimes referred to as a contract for deed) under which
the lots were sold and equitable title to the lots were conveyed out of the
Developer. The trial court, relying upon Leeson v. City of Houston,"'
determined that the mere execution of the "agreement" conveyed equita-
ble title to the purchaser. The Beaumont Court of Appeals reviewed
Leeson and the line of cases stemming from it and compared these cases
with Johnson v. Wood." 2 The court, for purposes of resolving the con-
flict, reviewed the discussion of the Leeson and Johnson cases in In re
Finley,113 and quoted the following:
[t]he seminal case in modem Texas jurisprudence on this issue is
Johnson v. Wood.... In Johnson, the court found that purchaser of
an executory contract possess[es] only an equitable right to consum-
107. Id. at 621.
108. Id. at 623.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 624.
111. 243 S.W. 485 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, judgm't adopted).
112. 138 Tex. 106, 157 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1941).
113. 138 B.R. 181, 182-84 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992).
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mation of that contract upon performance, i.e., full payment under
the terms of the contract. At the time of performance "that [equita-
ble right] ripen[s] into an equitable title .... ." As explained by the
court in In re Waldren, until a purchaser under a contract for deed
fully performs, the only interest that the purchaser possesses is his
right to perform under the contract."14
The court, in Club Corporation of America, pointed out that the holding
in Johnson has been precedent in Texas for fifty years and has been fol-
lowed by numerous courts. Of course, the court failed to note that the
Leeson case was decided in 1922, which would make it precedent in Texas
for over seventy years. Nonetheless, the court noted that the preceden-
tial value of Leeson and its progeny was questionable. 1 5 The court does
discuss the distinction between Leeson and Johnson, which were both de-
cided by the Texas Commission of Appeals. The distinction is that the
Supreme Court of Texas adopted the opinion in Johnson, which is consid-
ered more significant than merely adopting the judgment without regard
for the Commission's holding or reasoning, which was the case in Leeson.
Consequently, the court determined that Johnson provides the better re-
sult, and it thus appears accurate to say that a purchaser under a contract
for deed possesses only an equitable right under the contract instead of
an equitable title. Since the "Agreement" did not convey equitable title,
the lots remained "unsold".
Another case decided during the Survey period, Dickens v. Harvey,116
is a good reminder of the fact that lawyers, as drafters of conveyancing
documents, should make certain that they understand the meaning and
effect of the clauses used in legal forms. In 1977, C.J. Rutten executed a
coal and lignite lease which covered an 1162-acre tract of land which Rut-
ten owned. In 1982, Rutten conveyed fifty acres out of the 1162-acre
tract to Charles Harvey, the appellee. The deed to Harvey reserved from
the conveyance "all mineral reservations, royalty reservations and/or
mineral leases" in Rutten's chain of title." 7 The deed also provided that
"No Minerals are transferred by this Deed. 1" 8 Rutten later divided the
ownership of the minerals under the property among Dickens and others.
Harvey sued Dickens in 1992, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
1982 deed conveyed the coal and lignite to Harvey as a matter of law
because the substances were not expressly excepted from the conveyance
and were therefore part of the surface estate. The trial court granted
Harvey a summary judgment, which, among other things, declared that
the deed conveyed the coal and lignite to Harvey, and that the reserva-
tion clause did not reserve any right, title or interest in the coal and lig-
nite. The court, referring to Acker v. Guinn,119 opined that "parties
114. Club Corp., 881 S.W.2d at 625 (citing Johnson, 138 Tex. at 106, 157 S.W.2d at 146,
and In re Waldren, 65 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986)).
115. 881 S.W.2d at 625.
116. 868 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, no writ).
117. Id at 438.
118. Id.
119. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
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ordinarily do not contemplate that the surface estate will be destroyed or
substantially impaired by production of the minerals" and related the
holding of the Acker court which provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
"[u]nless the contrary intention is affirmatively and fairly expressed,
therefore, a grant or reservation of 'minerals' or 'mineral rights' should
not be construed to include a substance that must be removed by meth-
ods that will, in effect, consume or deplete the surface estate."' 20 Fur-
thermore, in Reed v. Wiley' 2' the Texas Supreme Court relied upon Acker
in holding "[b]ecause it is not expected that the parties to the instrument
would have intended the destruction of the surface by the mineral owner
in the absence of an expression of that intention, their use of 'mineral' in
the instrument is not construed to include the near surface sub-
stances."' 22 Ultimately, the case was retried and again reached the Texas
Supreme Court (the "Reed IT' case).' 2 3 In Reed If the court held that
coal and lignite deposits within 200 feet of the surface are "near surface"
as a matter of law. The court stated that a person claiming ownership of
coal and lignite as part of the surface estate must prove either (1) that the
substances lie within 200 feet of the surface, or (2) that their mining may
substantially impair or destroy the surface.' 24 Dickens is perplexing in
that Harvey acquired his fifty acre tract subject to an existing coal and
lignite lease, and his deed expressly provided that no minerals are trans-
ferred by this deed. The Dickens court remanded so that the trial court
might consider whether the coal and lignite were "near surface" and
therefore a part of the surface rather than a part of the minerals.'
25
The court's decision in Dickens is consistent with Graham v.
Kuzmich, 2 6 in which the court stated that "[r]eservations must be by
clear language."'1 27 In this case, Jose Ortiz acquired 17.06 acres from Ri-
cardo Ortiz. Ricardo Ortiz executed a warranty deed with vendor's lien
which expressly conveyed water rights associated with such tract. On the
same day that Jose Ortiz acquired the property, he gave a deed of trust to
International Bank of McAllen as security for a note pledging the 17.06
acres of land. Although the deed of trust did not expressly reference the
water rights, it did include a provision that the conveyance, pursuant to
the deed of trust, included "appurtenances, servitudes, rights, ways, privi-
leges, prescriptions, and advantages thereunto, belonging to or in anywise
appertaining.'1 2 8 The court believed this language reflected the bank's
120. Id. at 352.
121. 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
122. Id. at 170-71.
123. See Reed v. Wiley, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
124. 868 S.W.2d at 439 (citing Reed v. Wiley, 597 S.W.2d at 747, 748).
125. At least one moral of the case is that clients should be asked whether their coal
and lignite deposits are within 200 feet of the surface so that any mineral reservation will
also include those deposits.
126. 876 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
127. Id. at 449 (citing Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
128. Id. at 447.
[Vol. 481548
REAL PROPERTY
intent to obtain as security all of the interest in the land owned by Jose
Ortiz.l2 9 Jose Ortiz defaulted under the note and/or deed of trust and the
bank foreclosed and thereafter sold the property to Kuzmich. A dispute
arose regarding ownership of the water rights. The court noted that "[a]
permanent water right is an easement and passes with title to the
land,"1130 and that the general rule in Texas is that "[d]eeds are construed
to convey to the grantee the greatest estate possible.' 131 The court fur-
ther noted that "a deed that does not except property owned by the gran-
tor conveys the grantor's entire estate.' 132 The court held that the water
rights were included in the grant to the trustee in the absence of a reser-
vation or exception. 33 In this case, the deed of trust contained no such
reservation or exception and thus the entire estate, including water rights,
were sold at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, the warranty deed to
Kuzmich also included the water rights.
The final case in this section is Robbins v. HNG Oil Co.134 Although
this case is reasonably fact intensive, the outcome is predictable-the
plaintiff hits a dry hole. The appellant was the attorney-in-fact for the
heirs of a grantee named in a deed executed in 1911. The appellant
brought an action against various oil companies seeking to recover min-
eral royalties for property in the Spindletop oil field allegedly conveyed
to grantee in the 1911 deed. The 1911 deed specifically described four
tracts which were conveyed to the grantee. The 1911 deed recited that
the described four tracts conveyed by the deed represented all of the
property that J.H. McFadden, R.D. McFadden and A.J. McFadden inher-
ited through their ancestor, William McFadden. Appellant sought to ex-
pand the 1911 deed so that it was construed to include approximately
thirty-seven additional tracts of real property comprising the Spindletop
oil field in Jefferson County. It is worth noting that the appellant did not
contend that the 1911 deed was ambiguous. Since the question of ambi-
guity was not presented in the trial court, the deed's construction became
a question of law for the trial court. 135 The court, citing Coffee v.
Manly,136 noted that
where a recitation was made to another deed or another record for
the purpose of showing from what source the real property had been
derived and as a help in tracing the title, then such a reference or
referral will not and could not operate to enlarge the specific descrip-
tion given in the deed which contained the reference. 37
129. Id at 447.
130. Id. at 448 (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.040(a) (Vernon 1986); Edinburgh
Irrigation Co. v. Paschen, 235 S.W. 1088, 1090 (Tex. 1922)).
131. 876 S.W.2d at 448 (citing Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
132. 876 S.W.2d at 449.
133. Id.
134. 878 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).
135. Id. at 354.
136. 166 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1942, writ denied).
137. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 354-55.
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This principle of law applied to the 1911 deed because there was in that
deed an adequate and specific, unambiguous description of the four
tracts-hence, the reference in the 1911 deed cannot be given the effect
of enlarging the specific descriptions to include different, additional tracts
of land. This reference only served to show the source from which the
real property has been derived. None of the four tracts specifically de-
scribed in the 1911 deed contained any production; thus, the appellant hit
another dry hole.
IV. COTENANCY
There are two cases worthy of mention, although neither represents a
change in the law. The first case, York v. Flowers,138 discusses several
areas affecting Texas real estate law. In this case plaintiff brought suit in
May 1992 to establish that she was the illegitimate biological daughter of
Coburn Barlow and thus entitled to inherit his interest in a 41.5 acre tract
of land. Coburn Barlow died in 1944.139 The defendant filed a motion
for summary judgment which the trial court granted in all respects, in
effect finding that a recognized illegitimate child is not entitled to inherit
from the estate of her biological father who died intestate; that York's
claim was barred by the three, five, ten and twenty-five year statutes of
limitations, 140 and the plaintiff was barred by the four-year residual stat-
ute of limitations from seeking any entitlement to Barlow's estate. 141 For
purposes of the appeal, the court of appeals presumed that the plaintiff
was the illegitimate daughter of Coburn Barlow. Plaintiff was adopted by
Catherine Flowers. After the adoption, Catherine Flowers married
Coburn Barlow. During that marriage Coburn Barlow and Catherine
Flowers Barlow purchased a 41.5 acre tract of land. There was adminis-
tration of Cobum Barlow's estate when he died in 1944. In 1955, Cathe-
rine Flowers Barlow conveyed the 41.5 acre tract of land to Nathan
Flowers, who is the defendant's predecessor in title. It was noted that
under Texas law a recognized illegitimate child is entitled to inherit from
his/her father.142 When Coburn Barlow died in 1944 his wife took her
one-half interest in the 41.5 acre tract of land and his daughter, the plain-
tiff, inherited her father's one-half community interest in the 41.5 acre
tract.143 Thus, when Catherine Flowers Barlow executed the deed to Na-
than Flowers, she conveyed only her one-half community interest in the
tract of land, thus creating a cotenancy between plaintiff and Catherine's
successors. The court noted that "[a] cotenant will not be permitted to
claim the protection of the adverse possession statutes unless it clearly
appears that he has repudiated the title of his co-tenant and is holding
138. 872 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
139. Id at 14.
140. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & l M. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024-.028 (Vernon 1986).
141. Id. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986).
142. 872 S.W.2d at 14.
143. I. (citing TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 45 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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adversely to it."' 1 The court of appeals determined that there was no
evidence of actual notice of repudiation by Nathan Flowers. 145 The final
issue considered by the court related to the residual four-year statute of
limitations which provided that: every action for which there is no ex-
press limitation, except for an action for recovery of real property, must
be brought not later than four years after the cause of action accrued. 146
The court noted that this language had been a part of Texas law since
1879 and that the plain words of the statute excepted the four-year stat-
ute of limitations from an action for the recovery of real property.147
The second case dealing with cotenancy was In re Fender.148 In a nut-
shell, this concerned a dispute between TransAmerican Natural Gas Cor-
poration and Zapata Partnership, Ltd. regarding the meaning of a
settlement agreement. TransAmerican and Zapata had mineral interests
in the La Perla B Tract, which was part of the La Perla Ranch in Zapata
County, Texas. Zapata owned a 27.77% interest in the tract. TransAmer-
ican was the operator but was unable to lease Zapata's interest. Trans-
American and Zapata were cotenants in the minerals. 149 This case arose
out of a bankruptcy adversary proceeding. The proceeding was settled
and a settlement agreement was entered into between TransAmerican
and Zapata. The settlement agreement included a provision regarding
Zapata's right to receive a pro rata portion of any money which Trans-
American recovered in its take-or-pay litigation with El Paso Natural Gas
Company. When the El Paso Natural Gas Company litigation was set-
tled, Zapata and TransAmerican disagreed as to the meaning of Zapata's
pro rata portion. Although there were several issues considered by the
Fifth Circuit, for purposes of this Survey the issue for consideration is
whether, under Texas law and particularly cotenancy law, there is a fidu-
ciary or agency relationship between cotenants. The bankruptcy court
determined that TransAmerican owed Zapata a duty of good faith and
fair dealing and that TransAmerican breached this duty when it settled
with El Paso Natural Gas Company without Zapata's knowledge or con-
sent. 150 The Fifth Circuit noted that "under Texas law, there is no duty of
good faith and fair dealing in contracts generally, and in cotenancy law,
there is no fiduciary or agency relationship (which might create such a
duty) between cotenants unless they create it by agreement.' 15 ' This
must have made TransAmerican feel good-but only for a short time.
The amount TransAmerican wanted to pay Zapata was $806, which was
144. 872 S.W.2d at 15 (citing Todd v. Bruner, 365 S.W.2d 155, 156 (Tex. 1963)).
145. 872 S.W.2d at 15.
146. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986).
147. 872 S.W.2d at 16.
148. 12 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 1994).
149. Id. at 482.
150. Id. at 486.
151. Id. at 486 nn.7-8 (citing English v. Fisher, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983)); Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Kingston Investors Corp., 819 S.W.2d 607, 610-11 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); Donnan v. Atlantic Richfield, 732 S.W.2d 715,
717 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).
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easily affordable out of $300 million cash settlement; but alas, good faith
and fair dealing had nothing to do with Zapata's award of $7.3 million.
V. EASEMENTS
Robert Frost writes that "good fences make good neighbors." Robert
Frost did not know the McDaniels or the Calverts, because if he had he
may have written that good fences make good case law. In McDaniel v.
Calvert152 the Calverts obtained a permanent injunction against the Mc-
Daniels enjoining them from obstructing a roadway easement. The road-
way was more than seventy-seven years old, and in 1992 the McDaniels
constructed a gate across the roadway. In 1981, the property owner
whose land abutted the roadway granted an express thirty foot roadway
easement to the Veterans Land Board, the Federal Land Bank of Texas,
and to Hill. These easements were granted so that Hill could meet the
requirements of the Veterans Land Board to obtain financing for the
purchase of a tract of land which he later sold to Belew. Belew then sold
the land to the Calverts. McDaniels claimed that the easement was an
easement in gross because it was granted for the benefit of Hill. An ease-
ment in gross is personal to the grantee only and is generally not assigna-
ble or transferrable. 153 The court noted that an easement is never
presumed to be in gross when it can fairly be construed to be appurte-
nant. 154 An easement appurtenant is an easement interest which attaches
to the land and passes with it.155 The court had no trouble concluding
that the grant of the easement was to benefit the property abutting the
roadway and not a specific person. In this case, the easement provided
that "the roadway easement[s] [are] not exclusive, but shall be held and
used jointly and in common, by both the grantors and grantees herein,
and their respective heirs and assigns in title to any lands abutting said
roadway.' 56 That being the case, the court held that the easement de-
scribed was an easement appurtenant which is usually transferrable. 157
The court noted that "[a] transfer of the dominant estate automatically
includes the easement across the servient tenement's land.1158 The Mc-
Daniels also argued that the Calverts owned no interest in the easements
because the conveyances from Hill to Belew and from Belew to the
Calverts did not contain legal descriptions of the easement. The court
noted that the habendum clauses granted the recipients "the premises,
together with all and singular rights and appurtenances thereto and any-
152. 875 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, n.w.h.).
153. Id. at 484 (citing Farmer's Marine Copperworks, Inc. v. City of Galveston, 757
S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ)).
154. 875 S.W.2d at 484 (citing Genther v. Bammel, 336 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1960, no writ)).
155. First Nat'l Bank v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1975, no writ).
156. 875 S.W.2d at 484.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing Van de Putte v. Cameron County, W.C. and Improvement Dist. No. 7,
35 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1931, no writ)).
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wise belonging unto the said Veteran's Land Board of the State of Texas,
its successors and assigns forever . -159 The court noted that the deed
conveying the affected land did not specifically have to mention an ex-
isting easement because the easement follows the land without any men-
tion whatsoever. 160 As a result, the McDaniels had interfered with the
Calverts' easement rights. 161 The conclusion to be drawn from this case is
that the court disagreed with Robert Frost by tearing down the literary
fence.
In Wallace v. McKinzie' 62 the court again helped a landowner who re-
quired an easement across his neighbor's property. The McKinzies were
the owners of the north 1/2 of Section 44, which was landlocked. The
McKinzies' access to their property was a road that ran through the Wal-
laces' property to McKinzies' property. The McKinzies bought the prop-
erty in 1920 and had been using the road since that time. The McKinzies
filed an affidavit in the Deed Records of Kent County, Texas claiming an
easement by prescription over the roads on Wallaces' property for the
purpose of ingress and egress to Section 44. The Wallaces, after discover-
ing the affidavit, sued to cancel the affidavit and remove the resulting
cloud on the title to their property. The McKinzies affirmatively pleaded
that they were entitled to an easement by estoppel. The jury found that
the McKinzies had an equitable easement over the road leading to Sec-
tion 44.163 The trial court granted the McKinzies a permanent equitable
easement of "sufficient width to permit the full possession, use and enjoy-
ment of said Section 44."' 64 The Wallaces appealed challenging the exist-
ence, description, and permanence of the easement. The court discussed
the doctrine of equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais and, quoting Camp-
bell v. Pirtle,165 noted that "the formal equitable estoppel or estoppel in
pais-arises when one is not permitted to disavow his conduct which in-
duced another to act detrimentally in reliance upon it."' 66 Further, quot-
ing from Brown v. Federal Land Bank of Houston,167 the court noted
[t]here are so many ways in which estoppel may arise, they need not
be defined here, but broadly speaking, the general rule seems to be
laid down in 17 TEX. JUR. 128 Sec. 2 where this is said: "The idea or
notion which inheres in the word 'estoppel' is that one, who by his
speech or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner,
ought not to be permitted to adopt an inconsistent position, attitude
159. 875 S.W.2d at 484.
160. Id.
161. Id at 485.
162. 869 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
163. Id. at 595.
164. Id.
165. 790 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
166. Id. (quoting Campbell, 790 S.W.2d at 374).
167. 180 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
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or course of conduct and thereby cause loss or injury to such
other."168
The court, having said that, found that the Wallaces, by speech and con-
duct, induced the McKinzies to act in a particular manner. In this case
the evidence showed that the McKinzies had used the roadway for sev-
enty years and the Wallaces never objected. The court concluded that the
Wallaces, through their permissive and acquiescing behavior, engaged in
representations by their conduct. 169 The court also took note of two con-
versations which A.D. McKinzie had with Bert Wallace and Bilby Wal-
lace regarding the McKinzies' use of the road. Taking into account the
Wallaces' speech and conduct, the court affirmed that an equitable ease-
ment existed because the necessary elements as defined in the jury charge
were met, i.e., that representations were made by the landowner to the
adjacent landowner that certain rights exist to use the landowner's prop-
erty, that the adjacent landowner believed the representations to be true,
and that the adjacent landowner relied upon such representations. 170
The Wallaces next argued that the easement was not described with
sufficient certainty in the judgment. 17' The judgment contained a general
description of the road and how it was situated with respect to the McK-
inzies' and the Wallaces' properties. The judgment also contained a map
which was attached to and made a part of the judgment. The court, citing
Vrabel v. Donahoe Creek Watershed Authority and Bear v. Houston &
T C. Ry. Co. ,172 noted that the rule in Texas is well settled that sufficiency
of easements is the same as that required of conveyances of land and that




A major area of discussion during the Survey period involved the
meaning of the word "dwelling" in restrictive covenants. One of the larg-
est developments in the area of restrictive covenants involved the opera-
tion of community homes for mentally handicapped individuals in
residential areas. In Deep East Texas Regional Mental Health & Mental
Retardation Services v. Kinnear174 the Beaumont court was faced with a
challenge by individuals who objected to the construction of a community
home in their subdivision. The trial court enjoined the home's construc-
168. 869 S.W.2d at 595-96.
169. Id. at 596.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 545 S.W.2d 53, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ); Bear v. Houston & T.C.
Railway Co., 265 S.W. 246, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Gaveston 1924, no writ).
173. 869 S.W.2d at 597 (citing River Road Neighborhood v. South Texas Sports, 720
S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.)).
174. 877 S.W.2d 550 (Tex App.-Beaumont 1994, n.w.h.).
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tion based upon two restrictive covenants. 175 The appellate court re-
versed, holding the restrictive covenants ineffective to prevent
construction of a community home.176
The first restrictive covenant relied on by the district court required the
construction of single family dwellings.177 The trial court concluded that
the restriction barred the construction of a community home, since it
would be inhabited by multiple individuals who were not in a family
unit.178 The appellate court disagreed, saying that the restriction only re-
lated to construction, not use.179 The restriction only referred to the ar-
chitectural design of the building. If the home was built to resemble a
single-family structure, it would meet the covenant. Additionally, the
only use restrictions referred to residential, as opposed to commercial,
activity. Since the community home was residential in nature, it did not
violate the commercial use restrictions found in the covenant.180
The second restriction prohibited nuisances and annoyances in the sub-
division.' 8 ' The court concluded that there was no evidence to support
either a finding of nuisance per se under City of Sundown v. Shewmake182
or nuisance in fact, which is factually determined on a case by case ba-
sis.183 Consequently, the second restrictive covenant could not bar con-
struction of the proposed community home.
After ruling that the trial court had improperly enjoined the commu-
nity home's construction, the appellate court turned to the issue of how
the covenants should be viewed in light of applicable statutes.184 Reading
relevant state statutes, the court determined that the restrictive covenants
could not act to bar construction of a community home. 85 Specifically,
the Community Homes for Disabled Persons Location Act' 86 allowed the
use by right of a community home in any residentially zoned district.'8 7
Further, Texas Property Code section 202.003(b) prohibited the applica-
tion of restrictive covenants to prevent the use of property as a family
175. Id. at 554.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 554. The covenant read "[a]ll lots shall be known and described as lots for
residential purposes only. Only one one-family residence may be erected, altered, placed
or be permitted to remain on any lot. Said lots shall not be used for business purposes or
[sic] any kind nor for any commercial, manufacturing or apartment house purposes." Id.




181. The restriction read "[n]o noxious or offensive activity shall be carried on upon
any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or become an annoyance or
nuisance to the neighborhood." d
182. 691 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
183. 877 S.W.2d at 555.
184. Id. at 556-62.
185. l at 560-62.
186. TEx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 123.001-.010 (Vernon Supp. 1995).




home or community home. 188 The court determined that those statutes
were not so vague as to be unconstitutional, 189 and that any construction
of a restrictive covenant "that would restrict the use of the property as a
family home or a community home is disallowed.' 90
In another case involving the interpretation of "dwelling" in a restric-
tive covenant, Davis v. City of Houston,'9' a landowner operated a
beauty parlor on property restricted to single family dwellings. 92 Davis
did not live on her property, nor was it reserved for commercial use, as
were other tracts within her subdivision (thus exempting those tracts
from the single family dwelling restriction). Relying on cases similar to
Kinnear, she argued that the phrase "single family dwelling" referred to
the type of structure involved, not the uses for the structure. The court
disagreed, however, noting that the beauty parlor was a commercial use
of the property. 93 Using the ordinary meaning of the word "dwelling,"
the court determined that the use of the property for a beauty parlor
violated the use restrictions in the covenants. 94
B. REFORMATION
In another case, the Austin Court of Appeals had to determine whether
a covenant which was the product of mutual mistake should be reformed,
and whether two restaurants were competitors, as barred by the restric-
tive covenants. 95 A factory outlet center sold property to IHOP so that
IHOP could open a coffee-shop style restaurant.196 The contract for sale
included language which prevented the outlet center from selling prop-
erty to one of IHOP's competitors. 197 The version of the restrictive cove-
nant which appeared in the deed varied slightly. 198  During the
188. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.003(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994); 877 S.W.2d at 561.
189. Id. at 562.
190. Id. at 561.
191. 869 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
192. The deed restriction stated "[n]o structure shall be erected, altered, placed or per-
mitted to remain on any lot or other building plot other than one detached single family
dwelling and a private garage for not more than two cars and other out-buildings incidental
to residential use, other than as specifically set forth herein." Id. at 494-95.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 495-96.
195. New Braunfels Factory Outlet Ctr. v. IHOP Realty Corp., 872 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.).
196. Id. at 305.
197. The contract for sale included a provision which stated:
[sleller, for itself and its successors and assigns shall covenant at closing that,
for a period of thirty (30) years after the closing, it will not permit, lease,
allow or use, either by itself or any tenants thereof, directly or indirectly, any
portion of the Shopping Center (exclusive of the Property) acquired by
Seller or any of its affiliates or any property located within one (1) mile of
the boundaries of the property owned or controlled by Seller or its affiliates
for any kind of family-oriented, coffee shop styled restaurant that would di-
rectly compete with the purchaser's restaurant operation, such as, but not lim-
ited to ....
Id. at 305.
198. The deed included language which prohibited "any kind of family-oriented coffee
shop or restaurant that would directly compete." Id.
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negotiations with IHOP, the outlet center entered into discussions with
another purchaser interested in a tract in the outlet center, which later
proved to be a Cracker Barrel restaurant.
Before the outlet center could complete the sale to Cracker Barrel, it
needed IHOP's approval. IHOP reviewed Cracker Barrel's menu and
other information, determined that it was too direct a competitor, and
refused to consent to the sale pursuant to the restrictive covenant. 199
New Braunfels Outlet Center later sued IHOP, seeking to recover dam-
ages, to reform the restrictive covenant in the deed based on mutual mis-
take, and to void the restrictive covenant for lack of consideration. The
jury found that there was no mutual mistake and that either version of
the restrictive covenant would prevent the sale to Cracker Barrel.200
The outlet center first argued that it was entitled to reformation of the
restrictive covenant based upon mutual mistake. IHOP argued that the
doctrine of estoppel barred the outlet center from asserting mutual mis-
take.201 The court found no evidence to support IHOP's estoppel argu-
ment, and the court further noted that the outlet center's negligence in
discovering the errant wording would not bar reformation. 202 Since the
jury found mutual mistake, and there was no estoppel, the appellate court
ordered the reformation of the restrictive covenant in the deed.203
The court next discussed the effect, if any, which reformation had on
the restrictive covenant. The outlet center interpreted the covenant as
prohibiting only those restaurants specifically enumerated in the restric-
tion and restaurants which were family-oriented, coffee shop style restau-
rants that would directly compete with IHOP.204 Alternatively, IHOP
contended that the restrictive covenant created two classes of restaurants:
those which were prohibited by the covenant, and those which were per-
mitted. 20 5 The only relevant inquiry would be which class Cracker Barrel
199. Id at 306.
200. Id
201. Id. at 307. The necessary elements for equitable estoppel are (1) false representa-
tion or concealment of material facts with intent that another act on that representation or
concealment; (2) made by a party with knowledge of the facts; (3) to a party without
knowledge of the facts or means of knowledge; (4) who detrimentally relies on the misrep-
resentation. Id. (citing Gulbenkian v. Penn, 252 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1952)). IHOP also
asserted quasi-estoppel, which is similar to equitable estoppel but requires no showing of
false representation of detrimental reliance. 872 S.W.2d at 307.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 308. The reformed deed replaced the phrase "family-oriented coffee shop or
restaurant" with "family-oriented, coffee shop styled restaurant." Id.
204. Id This interpretation was based upon a reading of only the prohibitive language
in the covenant. Since Cracker Barrel was not specifically barred by name in the covenant,
the outlet center contended that Cracker Barrel was barred only if it was family-oriented,
coffee shop styled, and directly competitive with IHOP. Id. at 308-09.
205. The prohibited class was described as those which were family-oriented, coffee
shop styled restaurants that directly competed with IHOP. The permitted class was those
restaurants which did not directly compete with IHOP. 872 S.W.2d at 309.
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best fit. The court determined that IHOP's explanation was more
reasonable. 206
Having concluded that IHOP's interpretation was the proper one, the
court had to determine whether there was evidence to support the jury's
failure to find that a Cracker Barrel Restaurant was permitted by the
restrictive covenant. There was evidence that Cracker Barrel had
evolved into what the court described as a "modem coffee shop" restau-
rant, as well as evidence that Cracker Barrel was a direct competitor of
IHOP's. 20 7 Although the outlet center maintained that the covenant was
only effective against restaurants which were both coffee shop styled and
direct competitors, the court said only one of the two was necessary,
although both were met.20 8 Consequently, the outlet center was prohib-
ited by the covenant from selling the property to Cracker Barrel.
C. INJUNCTION
In a final case, the El Paso court dealt with injunctions to enforce re-
strictive covenants. In Ramsey v. Lewis2°9 the Ramseys purchased a du-
plex with an unobstructed view of the El Paso skyline. The duplex
agreement prevented other owners on the duplex lots from doing any
"act which would tend to depreciate the value of his dwelling unit, the
duplex of which it is a part, or any duplex situated on the above described
property.'210 The vendor allegedly informed the Ramseys that he in-
tended to build only a one-story duplex on the adjacent lot, so as not to
obstruct their view of the skyline. Later, however, he began construction
on a duplex with a peaked roof which would restrict or obstruct the Ram-
seys' view of El Paso. The trial court denied their request for a tempo-
rary injunction against the construction, stating that the Ramseys had an
adequate remedy at law for damages.
The appellate court noted that the Ramseys were not required to show
that they had no adequate remedy at law before they were entitled to a
temporary injunction.21' Unfortunately, the Ramseys were unable to
show that they were probably entitled to a permanent injunction. The
court determined that the restrictive covenant only applied to acts an
owner may commit regarding his or her own duplex, not construction on
adjoining lots. 21 2 There was no promise or representation that the Ram-
seys' duplex would have an unobstructed view of the skyline. Finally, the
206. The court noted that IHOP's construction was in keeping with the general rule
that portions of written instruments are not to be read in isolation, but rather in the con-
text of the entire instrument. Id at 309 n.4.
207. Id. at 309. Evidence was presented that the two restaurant's were factually com-
petitive, in that they sold similar items at similar prices. There was also evidence that the
industry treated them as competitors, based upon evidence appearing in industry and trade
literature, Id
208. Id.
209. 874 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1994, n.w.h.).
210. Id. at 322.
211. Id. at 323; see TEX. Civ. PitAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.011 (Vernon 1986).
212. 874 S.W.2d at 324.
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covenant and negative easement suggested by the Ramseys would be sub-
ject to the statute of frauds, so it could not be proven by parol evi-
dence. 213 Since the Ramseys could not show that they were entitled to
the equitable relief they ultimately sought, they could not enjoin the con-
struction on the adjacent lot.
VII. ADVERSE POSSESSION
In York v. Flowers214 the San Antonio court addressed the issue of ad-
verse possession by co-tenants. The case is discussed in the cotenancy
section of this Survey. However, of interest here is the fact that the court,
relying on Todd v. Bruner,2 15 noted that a co-tenant cannot claim title
through adverse possession unless he clearly repudiates his co-tenant's
title and holds adversely to his co-tenant's claim.216
In a second adverse possession case, Clements v. Corbin,217 a group of
plaintiffs brought an action against Clements to quiet title to approxi-
mately eighty acres of land in Jackson County claimed by Clements. Cle-
ments claimed title to the land through adverse possession,218 asserting
the ten-year statute of limitations. 219 The court stated that for Clements
to claim possession through limitations, he had to secure possession of
the property on or before December 21, 1980220 and his possession had to
be "open and notorious enough to raise a presumption of notice to an
owner of the property for a ten year period." 221 Testimony suggested
that Clements and his father began herding cattle on the land in 1978,222
that Clements had repaired existing fences on the land, cleared heavy
brush from the land, and began farming the land in 1980. Another mem-
ber of the community who used the land for grazing had given "disclaim-
ers" to anyone who questioned the community member's intentions in
using the land for grazing. Furthermore, the community member's
213. IdM at 323-24. The promise not to obstruct the duplex owner's view would create a
negative easement which would run with the land. Since it would effect an interest in real
estate and could not be performed within one year, it would be subject to the statute of
frauds. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987).
214. 872 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
215. 365 S.W.2d 155, 156 (Tex. 1963).
216. 872 S.W.2d at 15.
217. 880 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.). This opinion has been
withdrawn by the publisher because the opinion was not yet final.
218. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.021 (Vernon 1986) defines adverse pos-
session as "actual and visible appropriation of real property, commenced and continued
under a claim of right that is inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of another per-
son." See 880 S.W.2d at 518.
219. Id.
220. Clements filed a third-party petition against unknown property owners in the
eighty acre tract on December 21, 1990. To claim title through limitations under the ten-
year statute, he would need possession ten years before that date.
221. 880 S.W.2d at 518.
222. The only evidence regarding the Clements' use of the land for grazing purposes
came from their own testimony. No other witnesses saw them herding cattle on the pas-
ture land. No witnesses recalled seeing "Posted" signs around the property. Id at 519.
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widow testified that she had been unaware that Clements claimed title to
the land.
The court noted only the Clements' testimony suggested that they used
the land for grazing, although their cultivation for farming would gener-
ally be enough to establish adverse possession. The town mayor, how-
ever, claimed that he was unaware that Clements was claiming title to the
property; he thought Clements was making the same common use of the
property as did the remainder of the community. The court ruled that
common usage of the tract by others in the town, in a manner similar to
Clements' usage, justified a finding that Clements' usage was insuffi-
ciently visible, notorious and hostile to provide notice of his claim
through adverse possession.223
In a case involving implied dedication of a private roadway,224 the San
Antonio court was faced with the question of whether evidence was suffi-
cient to raise a question of material fact to avoid summary judgment
against the government. The landowner constructed and maintained a
road for his own private use. When his successor attempted to construct
a gate across the road, the county argued that the road was subject to
implied dedication.225 On summary judgment, the landowner only chal-
lenged the county's evidence on the first element of implied dedication,
which was that the landowner's acts indicated his intention to dedicate
the roadway to public use. While the court noted that the county would
have an extremely difficult burden of proof to convince a jury that the
landowners intended to dedicate the road to public use, the county on
summary judgment only had to introduce evidence to suggest that there
was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the landowners' intent for
the roadway.226 The county presented evidence that the county may have
financed and built the road, that it may have built and installed a gate
across the road, that it maintained the road, that the gate across the road
was not locked to prevent public access, that the road was continuously
used by the public, and that the deed to the property on which the road
was located included an easement for ingress and egress through the
road.227 That evidence was sufficient to prevent summary judgment in
favor of the landowner.
223. Idt To prove adverse possession, the possession must be actual, visible, continu-
ous, notorious, distinct, hostile, and of a manner to indicate an unmistakable assertion of a
claim of ownership. Id.
224. County of Real v. Hafley, 873 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ
denied).
225. The elements of common law implied dedication are: "'(1) the acts of the land-
owner induced the belief that the landowner intended to dedicate the road to public use;
(2) he was competent to do so; (3) the public relied on these acts and will be served by the
dedication; and (4) there was an offer and acceptance of the dedication.'" 873 S.W.2d at
727 (quoting Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle Co. v. Zavala County, 682 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex.
1984)).
226. 873 S.W.2d at 728.
227. Id. at 728-29.
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VIII. EMINENT DOMAIN / INVERSE CONDEMNATION
A. SCHMIDT FACTORS
One major area dealt with by the Texas courts during the Survey pe-
riod involved eminent domain and inverse condemnation proceedings.
Several cases, in fact, arose out of one set of circumstances involving the
conversion of Highway 183 in Austin into a controlled access highway. In
the principal case, State v. Schmidt,228 the state condemned a seven-foot-
wide strip of land running across the front of adjacent tracts of land
owned by Schmidt and Austex. Schmidt and Austex used their tracts to
operate freestanding commercial developments. The state intended to
use the additional land as a right-of-way so that Highway 183 could be
converted.
Ultimately, the highway would be elevated to eliminate grade cross-
ings. The buildings would then be less visible to motorists, and most of
the traffic through the area would be diverted to the main highway, which
would require motorists to exit a ramp to reach the businesses, thus mak-
ing it more difficult for motorists to access the businesses. 229 Although
the state paid for the taken lands, the landowners maintained they were
due additional compensation for the "impairment of its visibility from the
main highway,. . . the inconvenience and disruption caused by construc-
tion activities, . . . the diversion of traffic from the highway, . . . and the
resulting circuity of travel required to gain access to the tract.' '230 The
landowners argued that under the Texas Constitution 231 they were enti-
tled to compensation not only for the property taken, but also for damage
to the remaining property.232
The Supreme Court of Texas held that there was no right to recover
under an inverse condemnation theory for impaired visibility, inconven-
ience, traffic diversion, and more circuitous travel.233 It noted that "[jiust
as a landowner has no vested interest in the volume or route of passersby,
he has no right to insist that his premises be visible to them. '' 2M While
recovery may be allowed in cases of total temporary or partial permanent
restriction of access, or partial temporary restriction of access due to ille-
228. 867 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1993).
229. Id. at 771-72. After the highway was elevated, motorists would be required to exit
the freeway before they could enter the Schmidt and Austex developments.
230. Id. at 772. Later cases refer to these damages as Schmidt factors. See, e.g., State v.
Munday Enters., 868 S.W.2d 319, 320 (rex. 1993).
231. "No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to pub-
lic use without adequate compensation being made .. " TEx. CONsT. art. I, § 17.
232. 867 S.W.2d at 772-73. The landowners argued that "traffic patterns, convenience
of access, visibility, and the disruption of construction activities over an extended period of
time can affect the market value of property. Therefore, these factors must be taken into
consideration in ascertaining severance damages." Id. at 773.
233. Id. at 773-75.
234. Id. at 774 (citing JULius L. SACKMAN & PATRiCK J. RoHAN, NiciioLs, THE LAW
OF EMI r DOMAIN § 14.13[2], at 14-310 (3d ed. rev. 1992)).
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gal or negligent activity, inconveniences affecting the property or the ease
of access to the property do not constitute compensable damage.235
While the landowners conceded that they could not recover under an
inverse condemnation theory, they argued the standard should be differ-
ently applied since there was a physical taking of property (here the
seven-foot-wide strip). Since there was a taking, all factors affecting
property value, including those advanced by the landowners, had to be
considered when calculating damages for eminent domain and condem-
nation. The court disagreed, stating that the factors to be considered in a
recovery for eminent domain included the same factors as those for a
taking under inverse condemnation.236
The court also noted that the landowners were not entitled to compen-
sation because their damages arose from the state's use and modification
of an existing right-of-way rather than the taking of property.2 37 The con-
demnation statute only authorizes consideration of the effect of condem-
nation on a landowner's remaining property.238 In Schmidt, the damages
from diminution in value claimed by the landowners were not caused by
the taking of the seven-foot-wide strip of land, but rather from the state's
modification of the existing highway.239 Consequently, the Property
Code did not authorize recovery for the landowners.
The court further determined that the damages were community dam-
ages, which are not compensable. 240 While community damages were not
necessarily those in which injury was common to everyone on a street
where property was taken by eminent domain, they did require some par-
ticularity and locality to the affected property.241 The court announced
that the test for community injury or benefit was not based primarily
upon geography, but rather on the kind of injury suffered. The court held
"[i]t is the nature of the injury rather than its location that is critical in
determining whether it is community. '242 The supreme court concluded
that traffic diversion, inconvenient access, impaired visibility and con-
struction-related disruption were shared by the entire area bordering
Highway 183, and there was no claim of a unique effect to the particular
landowners from the conversion project.243 Consequently, there could be
no recovery for damages.
235. 867 S.W.2d at 775.
236. Id. at 775. The Court noted that allowing recovery for condemnation while not
allowing for similar injuries in inverse condemnation would create an anomaly. Had prop-
erty been taken from only one of the two adjacent landowners in Schmidt, both would
experience the same injuries, but only one would recover for those injuries. To solve the
problem, the Court denied recovery to both.
237. Id. at 777.
238. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.042(c) (Vernon 1984); see also 867 S.W.2d at 777.
239. 867 S.W.2d at 778.
240. Id. at 779. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.042(d) (Vernon 1984) only authorizes re-
covery for injuries "peculiar to the property owner" and may not consider "an injury ...
that the property owner experiences in common with the general community."
241. 867 S.W.2d at 780.




Other cases involved the same facts surrounding the elevation of High-
way 183. In State v. Munday Enterprises2 " a landowner operated an
automobile dealership along Highway 183. The state condemned approx-
imately one-tenth of the dealership acreage, for which the landowner was
compensated, which included compensation for damages to the remain-
ing acreage for a bisected building and partial permanent denial of access
to the roadway, as well as the relocation of buildings and driveways. The
landowner sought greater compensation at trial. The jury was not in-
structed regarding the disallowable factors decided in Schmidt,245 but
rather was asked in a single broad-form question the difference in value
in the entire tract with and without the taking. After an exorbitant award
was returned in the landowner's favor, the Supreme Court of Texas noted
that evidence had been presented regarding the Schmidt factors and that
the jury had improperly considered those factors in returning its ver-
dict.246 Consequently, the court remanded the case for new trial without
consideration of the Schmidt factors. In a later case, one court relied on
Munday as authorizing the merger of questions regarding the value of
land taken with remainder damages in broad-form submission to a
jury.247
A final case involving the Highway 183 elevation is State v. Centennial
Mortgage Corporation248 In that case, the elevation project devalued a
shopping center by causing the Schmidt injuries, destroying detention
ponds, and decreasing parking spaces. The court disallowed recovery for
decreased accessibility and visibility, as it did in Schmidt.249 The court did
allow consideration of losses such as the detention ponds and parking
spaces, since those damages were compensable. 250
B. EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT ACTION ON PROPERTY
SCHEDULED FOR CONDEMNATION
During the Survey period the Supreme Court of Texas also addressed
the actions a government or municipal authority may take which influ-
ence the value of land scheduled for condemnation. In State v. Biggar251
the landowners sought to exchange access easements with the state so
that the landowners' property could be further developed. After the
state gave technical approval of the exchange, the county began negotiat-
ing with the landowners in condemnation proceedings; however, they
were unable to reach an agreement as to a fair price for the property.
Shortly thereafter, the county communicated to the state its intent to con-
244. 868 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1993).
245. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
246. 868 S.W.2d at 320-21.
247. State v. Enterprise Bank-Houston, 873 S.W.2d 117, 119 (rex. App.-Waco 1994,
writ denied).
248. 867 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1993).
249. 867 S.W.2d at 784.
250. Id
251. 873 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1994).
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demn the property, so the state refused to exchange easements with the
landowners, which substantially decreased the property's value. The
County then condemned the land, and the landowners sued the state and
county, alleging that the "State intentionally caused the ... decrease in
the value of the . . . tract by denying their requests for an easement
exchange." 252
The court recognized that an action for inverse condemnation was
available where "the government acts to gain an unfair advantage
'against an economic interest of an owner.' "253 Since the state is able to
compel a sale from a landowner, it is required to give the landowner just
compensation for taken property.254 The state maintained, however, that
the refusal to exchange easements was a discretionary act, so it need not
have a rational reason for denying the exchange, and no cause of action
could lie for that denial. The court determined, however, that although
the exchange was a discretionary act, the refusal was used to prevent land
development in an effort to reduce the land's value.255 There was no
other evidence of a reason for denying the exchange. Ultimately, the
court held that "when the State takes action specifically designed to de-
crease the value required to acquire part of the landowner's property by
power of eminent domain and simultaneously damages the entire tract's
value.... the landowner may recover. '256
In Taub v. City of Deer Park257 the Texas Supreme Court reexamined
its holding in Biggar. In Taub the city sought to condemn portions of
Taub's property for street improvements and the construction of drainage
ditches. Two years later, while the condemnation actions were proceed-
ing, the landowner sought to re-zone his land to allow the development of
multi-family dwellings, which would increase his land's value. In meet-
ings before the Zoning and Planning Commission, numerous objections
were raised to re-zoning Taub's land, and his request was denied.258 Dur-
ing the condemnation proceedings, Taub's property was priced at the
lower single-family value rather than at the higher multi-family usage
value. Taub later brought suit against the city, arguing that the city took
his property by "refusing to rezone it... thus preventing him from profit-
ably developing the property. '25 9 The supreme court disagreed, stating
that the land had not been rendered completely useless or "deprived of
all economically beneficial use. ''260 Although the land perhaps could not
be developed profitably, the government had no. duty to underwrite
252. Id. at 12.
253. Id at 13 (quoting City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex. 1978)).
254. 873 S.W.2d at 13; see also Tex. CONST. art. I, § 17.
255. Id at 14.
256. Id
257. 882 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1994).
258. Evidence was presented at the meeting that re-zoning would require new city facil-
ities and personnel, prevent the provision of adequate fire, police, or school facilities for





Taub's investment as a profitable venture. Since the taking had no consti-
tutional implications, the failure to rezone the property was not a com-
pensable act.261 Relying on City of Austin v. Teague, Taub argued that
the dual role of a condemning agent and re-zoning agent provided the
city with an inherent conflict of interest. The court acknowledged the
potential for conflict, but dismissed Taub's cause, noting that he had
presented no evidence to show that the city denied the rezoning request
in an effort to lower Taub's property values and save the city money in
future condemnation proceedings.262
C. WHO IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION?
The appellate courts have also wrestled with the question of who is
entitled to compensation in eminent domain proceedings. In G.P. Show
Productions, Inc. v. Arlington Sports Facilities Development Authority,
Inc. ,263 G.P. Show was a tenant on property condemned for use in the
construction of a baseball stadium. G.P. Show requested compensation
for moving264 or relocation 265 expenses. Those expenses were denied on
the basis that only property owners266 are entitled to moving or reloca-
tion expenses, and G.P. Show was only a tenant rather than a property
owner.267 The Fort Worth court disagreed, noting that before the Prop-
erty Code was codified, the relevant provisions in the civil statutes in-
cluded lessees as property owners for the compensation of expenses. 268
Although the phraseology changed with the recodification, the court
noted that there was no indication of a legislative intent to effect the in-
terpretation of the law. Since lessees had been entitled to compensation
under prior law, they were entitled to compensation under the current,
re-codified law.269 Although there were no judicial decisions under the
prior laws of the meaning of "owner of the land," the later sections were
read consistently with the prior definitions of "property owner," so the
tenant was a property owner entitled to compensation.270
261. Id.
262. Id at 827. Without such evidence, the Court was unwilling to invalidate the refusal
to rezone.
263. 873 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, n.w.h.).
264. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.043 (Vernon 1984).
265. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.046 (Vernon 1984).
266. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.042 (Vernon 1984). The primary debate revolved
around the meaning of "property owner" found in this section, which was then applied to
the statutes authorizing compensation of owner's expenses.
267. 873 S.W.2d at 121-22.
268. The writ cited to TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 3265, § 7 (Vernon 1925) (current
version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.043 (Vernon 1984)).
269. 873 S.W.2d at 122-23. The Court stated that "a mere change of phraseology in the
revision of a statute in force before will not change the law previously declared, unless it
indisputably appears the legislature intended change." Id. at 122 (citing Palmer v. Palmer,
831 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ)).




In Green International, Inc. v. State271 the court addressed whether the
state's failure to pay on a contract can amount to a constitutional "tak-
ing" which requires compensation. Green International contracted with
the state to construct three prison units. After the units were substan-
tially completed, the state refused to pay the amounts due on the con-
tracts, and the governor vetoed a resolution which would have given
Green International permission to sue the state for breach of contract.
Despite sovereign immunity, however, Green International could main-
tain a suit without permission if the state's acts amounted to a compensa-
ble taking in contravention of the Texas Constitution. 272
The Austin Court of Appeals acknowledged that the appropriation of a
contract can amount to a constitutional taking which requires compensa-
tion,273 although such is not true in all cases. Frustration of contract
alone is not enough.274 To maintain an action for inverse condemnation
against the state, Green International was required to show (1) that the
state intentionally performed certain acts, (2) which resulted in a taking
of property (3) for public use.275 The court found that the state's actions
did not amount to an inverse condemnation. 276
The court identified four reasons why Green International was not en-
titled to compensation. First, since the state had acted consistently with
contract procedures, there was no intent to take unconstitutionally. 277
Also, a state's actions within a color of right only indicated an intent to
contract, not an intent to take. Since the state believed it could rightfully
withhold payment, there was no intent to take.278 Third, Green Interna-
tional voluntarily entered into a contract with, and delivered property to
the state, so there was no actual "taking" without Green's consent. 279 Fi-
nally, the Austin court specifically disagreed with a decision of the Dallas
court in Industrial Construction Management v. DeSoto Independent
School District,280 which held that a state waives sovereign immunity
when it enters into a contract with a private entity and that by not paying
on a contract, a government entity commits a compensable taking.28 In-
stead, the Austin court held that the formation of a contract only admits
to the state's liability on the contract; it does not give a party the right to
271. 877 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.).
272. Id. at 433. Based upon Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980), an
action for compensation following a condemnation in eminent domain or inverse condem-
nation is an exception to the state's general sovereign immunity.




277. 877 S.W.2d at 434.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 435.
280. 785 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
281. Id at 163.
1566 [Vol. 48
REAL PROPERTY
sue the state to enforce that liability.282 This split among the appellate
courts has not been specifically addressed by the Texas Supreme Court.
A final case, Harris County v. Felts,283 focused on the second element
of inverse condemnation, which requires the showing of a "taking" of
property. In Felts the county intended to use one square foot of a land-
owner's property for a road-widening project, which would entitle Felts to
payment. The county then redesigned the roadway so that it skirted the
property without taking any land. Although the County's appraiser ad-
mitted that the property was damaged by its proximity to the roadway,
the county refused to compensate Felts fully for the property's decreased
value. Despite the admission of damages, Felts was unable to recover
since there was no actual taking of property.28 Taking requires a physi-
cal appropriation of property, denial of access to the property, or some
other direct restriction on the use of property. 285 None of those require-
ments were met in Felts, so there was no compensable taking.
IX. MECHANIC'S LIENS
TWo mechanic's lien cases of note were decided during the Survey pe-
riod. The question in Hubble v. Lone Star Contracting Corp. asked:286
when does a cause of action on a debt accrue for purposes of determining
whether the statute of limitations has run? The owner of the property
involved in the project missed several project payments to the general
contractor. The general contractor filed a lien on the property and subse-
quently filed suit to foreclose its lien. Since the contract in Hubble was
executed prior to the effective date of the current two-year statute, 287 the
four-year statute of limitations governed. 288 The court stated that
[l]imitations begins to run on a continuing contract at the earlier of
the following: (1) when the work is completed; (2) when the contract
is terminated in accordance with its terms; or (3) when the contract is
anticipatorily repudiated by one party and this repudiation is
adopted by the other party.... Repudiation is conduct which shows
a fixed intention to abandon, renounce, and refuse to perform the
contract. 289
The court held that the filing of a mechanic's lien or the temporary stop-
page of work on the project did not constitute a repudiation.290 There-
282. 877 S.W.2d at 435.
283. 881 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ requested).
284. Felts argued that building a roadway in close proximity to his property, as well as
the noise and dust from construction, constituted an appropriation of property. Id. at 869-
70.
285. Id. at 868-69.
286. 883 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ requested).
287. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.158 (Vernon Supp. 1995) provides for a two-year limi-
tations period for contracts entered into after September 1, 1989.
288. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
289. 883 S.W.2d at 382.
290. Id. at 383.
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fore, the four-year statute of limitations had not run when the contractor
filed its suit.
The second mechanic's lien case concerns a claim under the McGregor
Act.2 91 In S. A. Maxwell Co. v. R. C. Small & Associates, Inc.,292 the sub-
subcontractor was not paid for the delivery of wallcovering materials, and
it filed suit against the general contractor and the surety for recovery
under the general contractor's payment bond. The questions involved
were whether the claimant's notice of nonpayment complied with the
timeliness and substantive requirements of the McGregor Act. To deter-
mine whether the claimant's notices were timely, the court had to deter-
mine when delivery of the materials occurred, since the notice limitations
period began to run from that date. The general contractor and the
surety argued that delivery occurred when the materials arrived at the
claimant's warehouse because, under the Uniform Commercial Code,
that is when title passed to the subcontractor. 293 However, the court held
"that under the language of the McGregor Act, delivery meant the actual
physical delivery of materials. ' '294 In this case, delivery of materials oc-
curred in May and June. Therefore, the notice deadline for the May de-
livery was July 15 and the notice deadline for the June delivery was
August 15. Since the claimant sent its notice for all of the materials on
July 26, its notice as to the May delivery was untimely and its notice as to
the June delivery was timely. In examining the sufficiency of the notices,
the court stated that the "McGregor Act's notice provisions require only
substantial compliance. '2 95 The court proceeded to examine in detail the
two notices that were sent by the claimant and concluded that they both
substantially complied with the requirements of the McGregor Act.296
The court's discussion of this issue is helpful in understanding the McGre-
gor Act's complex notice requirements.
X. LANDLORD / TENANT
Several cases during the Survey period involved Landlord / Tenant re-
lations. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander 97 the Supreme Court of
Texas addressed whether a lessee was responsible for common areas
outside the expressly leased premises. In Alexander the plaintiff tripped
over a ridge between an access ramp built by Wal-Mart and Wal-Mart's
parking area. She brought suit against Wal-Mart, maintaining that it, as
lessee, had a duty to maintain the ramp area to prevent accidents. Wal-
Mart responded that its lease with the property owner made Wal-Mart
291. TEX. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (Vernon 1987) (current version at TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2253.001-.079 (Vernon Supp. 1995)).
292. 873 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
293. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 2.401 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
294. 873 S.W.2d at 453.
295. Id. at 454.
296. Id at 454-56.
297. 868 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1993).
1568 [Vol. 48
REAL PROPERTY
liable only for areas within its store's exterior walls.298 Since the lessor
was responsible for the sidewalks and parking areas, Wal-Mart argued
that it, as lessee, had no duty to maintain those areas, and thus no liability
for accidents occurring in those areas. The court disagreed, noting that
Wal-Mart built the ramp at its own expense and initiative.299 Once it
built the ramp, it assumed control of the ramp. Consequently, Wal-Mart
had to exercise a "duty of reasonable care to maintain the safety of the
ramp once it built and exercised control over it."3°°
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the issue of mitigation of
damages by a landlord after a tenant fails to pay accrued rent during a
holdover lease. 301 In RTC v. Cramer two tenants under lease agreements
held over after the end of the primary term of the leases. During the
"holdover" periods, the tenants failed to pay the majority of their rents.
When the landlord later brought suit for the accrued rents, the district
court instructed the jury that the landlord has a duty to mitigate dam-
ages. 302 The appellate court noted that when the lessee abandons a lease
during the primary term, the landlord generally is not required to miti-
gate damages.30 3 In the instant case, however, the abandonment oc-
curred not during the primary term, but rather during the holdover
period. The holdover created a month-to-month rental arrangement. In
that instance, since the landlord had no common law duty to evict the
tenants when they failed to pay their rent,3°4 there was no duty to miti-
gate damages. 305
In Markert v. Williams3°6 the appellate court dealt with another ques-
tion of first impression, specifically, whether failure to exercise a right of
first refusal, with a subsequent sale of the subject property, terminated a
fixed-price option to purchase the subject property. In that case, the les-
sor granted to the lessee a right of first refusal on the leased premises.30 7
The same lease also granted the lessee a fixed-price option to purchase
298. The lease stated "[tihe maintenance by Lessor is to include, without limitation, the
following: (a) Maintaining the surfaces of all sidewalks, paved and parking areas in a
smooth and evenly covered condition .... Id. at 324.
299. Id. at 324.
300. Id at 325. The Court later reversed the punitive damages verdict against Wal-
Mart, finding that it had not been grossly negligent in its failure to maintain the ramp and
parking area. Id. at 327.
301. RTC v. Cramer, 6 F.3d 1102 (5th Cir. 1993).
302. Id. at 1108.
303. Id. The landlord has the option of either treating the abandonment as an anticipa-
tory repudiation of the lease and suing for damages, or disregarding the abandonment,
enforcing the lease and suing for accrued rents. Id
304. The tenants quit paying the month-to-month rent in May of 1990, although they
held over as month-to-month tenants until December of 1990. Id at 1105.
305. Id at 1108.
306. 874 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
307. The lessee held the "exclusive right to purchase the demised premises ... on the
same terms and at the same price as any bona fide offer for said premises received by
Lessor." Id at 354.
1995] 1569
SMU LAW REVIEW
the leased premises.30 8 During the lease's primary term, the property was
sub-leased. The lessor received an offer on the property, and the lessee
declined to exercise its right of first refusal. After the property was sold,
the sub-lessee purchased the lessee's interest in the lease and attempted
to exercise the fixed-price option against the lessor's successor. The court
determined that the failure to exercise the right of first refusal did not
terminate the fixed-price option; however, the subsequent sale following
the failure to exercise the refusal right did terminate the lessee's option to
purchase. 3°9 In effect, therefore, a lessee's option terminates after the
sale is closed.310
In Parkway/Lamar Partners, L.P. v. Tom Thumb Stores, Inc.,311 the
court addressed the issue of how to determine a tenant's insolvency. In
Parkway/Lamar the lessor brought suit to terminate a commercial real
estate lease, claiming that the lessee and its guarantor were in default on
the lease because they were insolvent. 312 The appellate court primarily
addressed the meaning of the term "insolvency," holding that the term
depends upon the context in which it is used. 313 The lessee argued that
insolvency only occurs when a corporation is unable to pay its debts as
they come due in the usual course of business. The lessor maintained that
insolvency occurs when a corporation either ceases to pay its debts in the
usual course of business, cannot pay debts as they come due, or is insol-
308. The Lessee held "[t]he right to purchase the demised premises ... at any time
during the term of this lease or any extension thereof, for the sum of Seventy Five Thou-
sand (75,000.00) Dollars .... Id.
309. Id. at 358.
310. The authors have a difficult time coming to grips with the holding in this case. The
lease specifically provided as follows:
Lessor hereby grants to Lessee: (a) the right to purchase the demised prem-
ises, together with all improvements and equipment thereon, free and clear
of all liens and encumbrances at any time during the term of this lease or any
extension thereof, for the sum of Seventy-five Thousand (75,000.00) Dollars;
and, (b) The exclusive right to purchase the demised premises with all im-
provements including the tanks, and equipment thereon, except gasoline
marketing equipment above the ground, free and clear of all liens and en-
cumbrances, at any time during the term of this lease, or any extension
thereof, on the same terms and at the same price as any bona fide offer for
said premises received by Lessor and which offer Lessor desires to accept.
Lessor shall notify Lessee of each such offer received and Lessee shall have
twenty (20) days after receipt of notice in which to exercise Lessee's prior
right to purchase.
Clearly, the lessee's fixed-price option is for the full term of the lease and any extension of
the lease. Nonetheless, the court construed the lease to provide that if the lessor receives a
bona fide offer at any time during the term of the lease, the lessee can purchase the prop-
erty at a price equal to the lesser of the fixed price option amount or the bona fide offer
amount. We cannot read the lease in this manner. When the original owner (Lessor) sold
the property to the new owner, the new owner acquired title subject to the lease and the
leasehold. The new owner knew what he was purchasing. If the new owner does not have
to give effect to the provision of the lease governing the lessee's fixed-price option right,
then why wouldn't the new owner be bound by any other terms under the lease? The
conveyance itself did not terminate the lease.
311. 877 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
312. The lease gave the lessor the right to re-enter the premises if the lessee became
"bankrupt or insolvent." Id. at 850.
313. Id. at 849.
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vent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy laws, which requires
that debts are greater than assets or property.314 Since the lessor's defini-
tion included bankruptcy as a test for insolvency, and the lease specified
bankruptcy and insolvency as separate grounds for re-entry, the court
construed insolvency as something distinct from bankruptcy.3 15 Conse-
quently, the court interpreted insolvency to mean an inability to pay
debts as they come due in the usual course of business, 316 and the lessee
and its guarantors were not in default under the lease.
XI. ALIENATION OF PROPERTY
One case during the Survey period involved the issue of whether a cor-
poration dissatisfied with an agreement into which it entered voluntarily
could avoid that agreement under the public policy against restraints on
the alienability of property.3 17 In that case, Procter Company sold Jeffer-
son Drug Company to Foxmeyer, which then merged Jefferson into an
existing subsidiary. The only real estate involved in the transaction was a
warehouse in Beaumont. The merger agreement stated that should
Foxmeyer fail to utilize the warehouse, Procter would have a thirty-day
option, beginning from the termination of the warehouse's use, to repur-
chase the warehouse at book value. Following the merger, Foxmeyer
ceased use of the warehouse. Procter sent Foxmeyer a cashier's check for
the book value of the warehouse, 318 which Foxmeyer refused to accept.
Foxmeyer then filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that the option in the
merger agreement was an unreasonable restraint on alienation of prop-
erty.319 The trial court granted summary judgment in Foxmeyer's
favor.320
Procter argued that the option did not constitute an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation because it was similar to a right of first refusal, which
314. The lessor based its definition primarily upon the Texas Uniform Commercial
Code, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(23) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The court
ultimately rejected that definition since the term insolvency was used in connection with a
lease transaction, which is outside the scope of the UCC. 877 S.W.2d at 849.
315. 877 S.W.2d at 850.
316. The court based its reasoning on the use of bankruptcy as a separate basis for
default, the definition of insolvency found in the Business Corporation Act, TEx. Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. § 1.02(10) (Vernon Supp. 1994), and the general definition of insolvency.
877 S.W.2d at 850.
317. Procter v. Foxmeyer Drug Co., 884 S.W.2d 853, 956 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994,
n.w.h.).
318. The book value when Procter exercised its option was $79,955.38. The market
value of the warehouse at that time was $550,000. Id. at 857.
319. The Court noted that most cases involving options to purchase involve the rule
against perpetuities. Neither Procter nor Foxmeyer raised the rule against perpetuities,
therefore, the court did not address it. Relying on Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312, 319-
20 (Tex. 1963), the court noted that the alienation doctrine may be more applicable to
commercial transactions than is the rule against perpetuities. 884 S.W.2d at 857 n.2.
320. As a portion of that holding, the trial court stated that paragraph 10.7 of the
merger agreement made the option unlimited in duration. That paragraph stated "[a]ll
terms and provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of
the parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns." 884 S.W.2d at 857.
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itself does not constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation. A right
of first refusal requires a property owner to offer the property to a partic-
ular purchaser at a stipulated price before the owner can sell to another
purchaser. 321 Procter argued that with both options to purchase and
rights of first refusal, the landowner must unilaterally decide to stop using
the property before the option becomes effective. Therefore, in neither
case can the option-holder force a sale. Procter then argued that rights of
first refusal were acceptable under the Restatement (Second) of Property
(Donative Transfers),322 so by analogy, options to purchase would not be
in contravention of the policy against alienation.
The court rejected Procter's argument, noting that a right of first re-
fusal allows a purchaser to buy on terms offered by a bona fide purchaser.
The price is not determined by prior agreement, but rather is set when an
offer is received from a third party. Therefore, the right of first refusal is
not an acceptable analogy to justify an option as in Procter, since
Procter's price was set by a preexisting agreement. 323 The court also held
that the Restatement provisions regarding donative transfers were only
effective to declare transactions valid; they were ineffective to declare
commercial transactions invalid (since commercial transactions are not
donative in nature).324 Further, the court determined as a matter of law
that book value was not a reasonable price, as required by Restatement
section 4.4.325 Additionally, the court held that the option's duration was
unlimited, since paragraph 10.7 of the agreement extended the option to
the parties' successors and assigns. Since the duration was unlimited, the
option violated section 4.4.326 Finally, the court concluded that the op-
tion was a restraint on alienation, since the sale of the warehouse by the
subsidiary to a third party would terminate the subsidiary's use of the
warehouse, which would trigger Procter's option to purchase. Conse-
quently, the subsidiary could never transfer the warehouse, since that
transfer would allow Procter to purchase the warehouse. Procter there-
fore could not justify the option based upon the Restatement (Second) of
Property.327
Having decided that it could not, as a matter of law, enforce the agree-
ment, the court finally turned to whether the option was unreasonable as
a matter of law.328 If not, the option would still be enforced as written.
321. Id. at 359.
322. The terms of the right of first refusal must be reasonable regarding both price and
time for exercise. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 4.4 (1981); 884 S.W.2d at 859
relying on Randolph v. Terrell, 768 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. App.-'lyler 1987, writ denied)
adopting § 4.4)).
323. 884 S.W.2d at 859.
324. See 884 S.W.2d at 858. Consequently, the court could not rule in Foxmeyer's favor
on Procter's theory; instead, the Court could only fail to find in Procter's favor on the
Restatement argument.
325. IM at 859.
326. 884 S.W.2d at 860-61.
327. Id& at 861.
328. The court first determined whether Procter met its burden of proving that it was
entitled to enforcement of the option. Since it did not, the court would still have to enforce
1572 [Vol. 48
REAL PROPERTY
The two criteria for analyzing options are the reasonableness of its time
limit and whether the option "bears some relationship to the harm the
policy against undesirable restraints on alienation was designed to pre-
vent." 329 As noted, the court decided that the duration was indeed un-
limited. The court then examined the policy against restraints on
alienation. Those policies are: (1) balancing the interests of current and
future property owners in the same property; (2) reducing the risk of
property investment; and (3) allowing owners the current enjoyment of
their property as necessary within a competitive economy. 330 Only if the
option violated one or more of those three policies would the option be
voided.
The court then concluded that the option violated the second and third
policies. The second policy, that of reducing the risk of property invest-
ment, was violated because the subsidiary could only use the warehouse
or sell it to Procter; it could never sell to a third party who offered a
higher price without triggering Procter's option to purchase.331 Since
there existed a broad disparity between the book value and market value
of the property, and Procter was entitled to purchase at the lower value,
Foxmeyer could never dispose of the property. The third policy of al-
lowing owners the current enjoyment of their property was violated be-
cause the vast disparities in values prevented Foxmeyer from realizing
approximately $470,000 in a sale or transaction money which would have
been available to meet current exigencies. 332
To summarize, since the option was not analogous to a right of first
refusal, and the donative transfer law was only applicable to the validity
of commercial transactions rather than their invalidity, the option agree-
ment could not be justified on its face. The burden then shifted to
Foxmeyer to show the option's invalidity. The court determined that the
fixed-price option, which carried an unlimited duration, was invalid as a
matter of law since the option violated public policies against restraints
on alienation of property. Therefore, the option itself was invalid and
Foxmeyer could avoid its contract with Procter.
XII. CONDOMINIUMS
Effective January 1, 1994, Texas has replaced the Condominium Act 333
with the Uniform Condominium Act (Uniform Act), 334 which has already
been adopted in eleven other states.335 The newly adopted Uniform Act
the option unless Foxmeyer could prove that the option was unreasonable as a matter of
law. Thus, the case's procedural posture forced the court to review the option from two
separate viewpoints.
329. 884 S.W.2d at 862.
330. Id
331. Id. at 862.
332. Id.
333. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001-.210 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1995).
334. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001-.164 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
335. Those jurisdictions include Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 35-8A-101 to -417 (1994); Ar-
izona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1201 to -1270 (1994); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
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generally applies to all condominium declarations recorded on or after
January 1, 1994,336 as well as declarations recorded before January 1, 1994
if either (1) the unit owners vote to amend the declaration to have the
Uniform Act apply, 337 or (2) the recorded declaration states that the Uni-
form Act will apply after January 1, 1994.338 All other condominium dec-
larations are governed by the former Condominium Act,339 with some
notable exceptions. 340
A. NEW PROVISIONS
The Uniform Act expands the content requirements for condominium
declarations. Declarations must now contain the word "condominium" in
the association name,341 identify each county where any part of the con-
dominium is located, 342 and state the maximum number of units which
the declarant may create.343 The Uniform Act also requires a description
of all real property that may be allocated as common elements, excluding
real property subject to development rights.344 The declaration must
state "any restrictions on use, occupancy, or alienation of the units."345
The Uniform Act requires that the declaration include descriptions of the
recording data for easements and licenses "appurtenant to or included in
the condominium,"346 a description of the declarant's reserved develop-
ment rights,347 and a statement regarding any varying development
rights.3" Finally, the declaration must contain a statement regarding the
condominium association's obligation to rebuild or repair the condomin-
ium after a casualty. 349
The Uniform Act also contains several new provisions, including guide-
lines for leasehold condominiums.350 The Act also contains provisions
33, §§ 1601-101 - 1604-118 (1994); Minnesota, MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 515A.1-101 to .4-117
(1994); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 448.1-101 to .4-120 (1994); New Mexico, N.M. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 47-7A-1 to 47-7D-20 (1994); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47C-1-101
to -4-120 (1994); Pennsylvania, 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-3414 (1994); Rhode Is-
land, R. I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-36.1-1.01 to -4.20 (1994); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. 55-79.39 to
-79.103 (1994); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 64.34.010 to -.950 (1994).
336. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
337. Id § 82.002(a)(1).
338. Id § 82.001(a)(2).
339. Id. § 82.0011.
340. Id § 82.002(c).
341. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.055(1) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
342. Id § 82.055(2).
343. Id. § 82.055(5).
344. Id. § 82.055(7).
345. Id. § 82.055(9).
346. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.055(10) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
347. Id. § 82.055(14).
348. Id. § 82.055(15). "Varying developments rights" refers to development rights
which may be exercised differently with respect to "different parcels of real property at
different times." Id.
349. Id. § 82.055(13).
350. Id. § 82.056.
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for the alteration,3 51 relocation,35 2 and subdivision of condominium
units.353 New provisions enumerate and limit the management role
played in condominium regimes by secured lenders.354 Finally, the Uni-
form Act creates a statutory lien on behalf of the association for common
expense assessments,355 and includes new disclosure requirements
designed to protect condominium purchasers. 356
The Uniform Act varies from the prior Condominium Act in several
respects. The prior act required, at a minimum, a sixty-seven percent
vote of a condominium's ownership before a condominium declaration
could be amended.357 The Uniform Act maintains the sixty-seven per-
cent minimum vote, although a lesser percentage may be stated in the
declaration if the condominium is reserved exclusively for non-residential
use.358 The prior act contained no lesser minimum for exclusively non-
residential use.
The Uniform Act also contains revised provisions for the termination
of a condominium regime.359 While the Condominium Act required ap-
proval of at least sixty-seven percent of the owners to terminate a condo-
minium regime,3 60 if the declaration was silent regarding termination, 100
percent approval was required.361 After a declaration was recorded, it
could not be amended to reduce the percentage required to terminate the
condominium regime.3 62 The Uniform Act retains the requirement of
100% approval to terminate a condominium regime where the declara-
tion is silent as to termination approval.3 63 The Uniform Act does not,
however, retain the absolute sixty-seven percent minimum from the Con-
dominium Act, although it does contain a new provision requiring an
eighty percent minimum approval to terminate an exclusively residential
condominium regime.364 The Uniform Act also provides for termination
351. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.061 (Vernon Supp. 1995). Although the Condomin-
ium Act purported to contain provisions for the alteration of condominium units, those
provisions only applied to the partitioning and conveyancing of common elements. See
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.108-.109 (Vernon 1984).
352. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.062 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
353. Id. § 82.063.
354. Id. § 82.069.
355. Id. § 82.112-.113.
356. Id. § 82.151-.162. The Uniform Act requires a condominium to maintain an infor-
mation statement regarding the condominium, which is available to purchasers. The de-
clarant or vendor is liable for all information presented in the disclosure. TEX. PROP.
CODE § 82.152 (Vernon Supp. 1995). Violations of the disclosure requirements are action-
able by the purchaser. TEX. PROP. CODE § 82.161 (Vernon 1995).
357. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 81.102(a)(7) (Vernon 1984).
358. Id. § 82.067.
359. Id. § 82.068.
360. Id § 81.110(a).
361. Id. § 81.110(a).
362. TEX. PROP. CODE § 81.110(a) (Vernon 1995).




agreements among the unit owners365 as well as contracts for termination
entered into by the association on behalf of the unit owners.366
The managerial role played by the Condominium Association is more
clearly defined in the Uniform Act than in the Condominium Act. The
Condominium Act generally empowered a council of owners to manage a
condominium regime.367 The Uniform Act more specifically enumerates
the powers of the condominium association.368 The Uniform Act also
places obligations and standards for conduct on association board mem-
bers.369 The association may also terminate contracts between the associ-
ation and its declarant if: (1) the contract is entered into while the
declarant controls the association; (2) it is terminated within one year of
the elected board taking office; and (3) the association gives ninety days
notice of its intent to terminate the contract. 370
B. UNIVERSALLY APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
Several provisions of the Uniform Act apply to all condominiums, re-
gardless of the declaration's recordation date.371 Now, all units not
owned by the declarant are separately taxed parcels of real property. 372
The Uniform Act also prescribes the applicability of local laws to condo-
minium associations. 373 All units are now controlled by the condemna-
tion provisions contained in the Uniform Act. 374 New provisions also
control the applicability and interpretation of bylaws and the recorded
declaration, 375 as well as the required unit descriptions. 376 All enumer-
ated powers of owner's associations apply to all condominium units,
whenever declared, including those powers regarding bylaws, budgets,
agency authority, and the ability to contract. 377 The insurance and lien
provisions are also universally applicable. 378 Finally, the provisions for
365. Id. § 82.068(b).
366. Id. § 82.068(c). Such a contract requiring termination of the condominium regime
is not binding on the unit owners until the actual termination has been approved by the
requisite vote. Id.
367. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 81.201 (Vernon 1984).
368. Id. § 82.102(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995). Among other items, the association, acting
through its board, can adopt and amend bylaws, § 82.102(a)(1); collect assessments,
§ 82.102(a)(2); engage in litigation, § 82.102(a)(4); enter into contracts, § 82.102(a)(5); reg-
ulate condominium structure and appearance, § 82.102(a)(6); and acquire and hold prop-
erty, § 82.102(a)(9).
369. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.103(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995). The Uniform Act
makes board members and officers liable to unit owners as fiduciaries. Id.
370. Id. § 82.105.
371. Id. § 82.002.
372. Id. § 82.005.
373. Id. § 82.006.
374. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.007 (Vernon Supp. 1995). The Uniform Act
prescribes specific methods of determining compensable losses.
375. Id. § 82.053.
376. Id. § 82.054.
377. Id. § 82.102(a)(1-7) & § 82.102(a)(12-22).
378. Id. §§ 82.111, 82.113.
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record-keeping, 379 management certificates, 380 resale,381 and attorney's
fees for actions arising out of failure to disclose382 are applicable to all
condominiums, whenever declared.
379. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.114 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
380. Id § 82.116.
381. Id. § 82.157.
382. Id. § 82.161.
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